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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and motivation 
 
Sports economics is a fascinating field of study that combines people’s love for the sports 
with financial rationalizing. Too often these things are kept separately, and one can only 
hope that the future will be brighter for sports economics. Don’t get me wrong. We’ve 
been able to enjoy reading numerous spectacular works in the field, such as Rottenberg 
(1956), Lewis (2003) or various studies conducted by Stefan Szymanski. Still the overall 
amount of research is quite low and in many fields the research is only taking its first steps. 
There are numerous different and financially important fields of study under sports 
economics that should be studied and updated frequently. Lately, financial importance of 
professional sports has grown enormously, which has even emphasized the importance of 
sports economics. Right now, it seems that it is the European club football that’s leading 
the financial growth to new heights every single year. 
 
Football is one of the most fascinating sports that people have invented. It touches people 
all over the world and it brings joy for people’s lives, no matter what the living conditions 
or wellbeing might be. Football has grown to be part of people’s daily lives. It has its place 
in the culture, religion and politics, but even more importantly it’s the dream of young 
boys and girls who want to follow the same steps as Pelé or Maradona. They want to 
pursue their dreams and perhaps even make a living as a professional footballer someday. 
Hence, it’s awfully sad to notice that a sport that has such a huge place in many people’s 
heart, is suffering from financial difficulties, and that actions have had to be taken to 
restore the financial health of football. At the same time football is a) growing its financial 
importance by impressive revenue growth and b) worrying people by continuous losses 
that clubs keep on reporting. This development has even increased the importance that 
sports economics have over football, and recently football has been one of the most studied 
sports in the academic research of sports economics. One factor behind this development is 
greatly expressed in the report by Deloitte (2017b): “The ever-changing financial 
landscape of football over the past 20 years has been both extraordinary and fascinating in 
equal measure.” 
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By only reading the news about transfer fees or players’ wages, it shouldn’t surprise that 
many European football clubs have struggled to make profit. Impressive revenue growth 
doesn’t seem to affect the profitability of the clubs, as extra income is often used to hire 
better players. Associations and league organisations have had to react on this development 
to protect football’s long-term financial viability. Union of European Football Associations 
(UEFA) introduced Financial Fair Play Regulations, which clubs have to follow if they 
want to avoid specific sanctions. Domestic league organisations have also started to 
regulate clubs’ financials, at least to some extent. Main objective in most of the regulations 
is to make clubs operate on the basis of their own generated revenues and to prevent clubs 
from making continuous losses and covering them by their owner’s money. 
 
There are lots of interesting aspects to study football under the field of sports economics. 
In this study, I’ll aim to provide a good theory basis on numerous interesting subjects of 
research that shape the financial framework of European club football. In empirical part of 
the study, I will especially concentrate on the fascinating connection between clubs’ 
financial performance and sporting success. In my opinion, this is a field of study that has 
been too overlooked by the academic research of sports economics. Recent development of 
financial regulating has even increased the importance of this aspect, and now I’ll use my 
own effort trying to add knowledge on this particular field of study. 
 
The connection between clubs’ financial performance and sporting success will be studied 
by building different multivariate linear regression models. Financial performance of the 
clubs will be measured by revenues and operating profit, whereas domestic league 
positions will be used to measure sporting success. The results obtained will be 
comprehensively analysed with the help of various sensitivity tests. Hopefully the study 
will add knowledge of the connection to prior research, and perhaps even reveal new 
results that could be further studied. 
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1.2 Objectives and research questions 
 
The primary objectives of this study are to a) provide a comprehensive theory basis of 
European club football in the field of sports economics and b) find out if European football 
clubs’ league positions are correlating with their revenues or operating profit. The study 
will also seek for differences in correlation results through set of sensitivity tests. Hence, 
the correlation results will be for instance compared between leagues and time periods. 
The most significant studies and their results will be discussed in theory part of the study. 
I’ll try to give a good overall picture of the field, where professional football clubs are 
operating and the numerous fascinating factors that are affecting the everyday operations 
of the clubs. 
 
The research type is quantitative, and financial data used in the study is gathered from 
Orbis –database, which is produced and held by Bureau van Dijk. The sporting data is 
obtained from the web archives of each league, and the data will be analysed using 
multivariate linear regression models. Hypotheses will be presented later in the study, but 
they are all based on theories and results from previous studies, which will be discussed in 
the theory part of this study. In addition, my own analytical thinking has been exploited in 
forming of the hypotheses. 
 
The data of the empirical study will be limited to five largest leagues in European club 
football. These leagues are English Premier League, German Bundesliga, French Ligue 1, 
Italian Serie A and Spanish La Liga. These, so called “top-five” leagues, are dominating 
European football, and in most recent listing by Deloitte (2018), there are only two clubs 
outside of top-five leagues, that reach top-30 position when measuring club’s size by 
revenue in season 2016/2017 (23rd FC Zenit Saint Petersburg and 30th Benfica). The data 
will be gathered from 10 consecutive years and seasons, from 2007 to 2016. The first year 
of the data will be used in formation of the models, but the core analysis is done for time 
period 2008-2016. 
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1.3 Research structure 
 
The second chapter will provide a comprehensive theory basis for the study. I will focus on 
forming a good financial framework of football clubs’ operations. The most significant 
studies and their results of the subject will be discussed. The chapter is divided to five 
main factors that are all shaping the everyday business of European football clubs. Each of 
the factor will be discussed especially reflecting their impact on the connection between 
clubs’ financial performance and sporting success. 
 
The empirical part of the study will begin on third chapter, where the hypotheses are 
presented. It will be followed by the presentation of the data and methodology in chapter 
four. The fifth chapter will present the empirical results that are received from the 
multivariate linear regression models and sensitivity tests. The results will be also 
discussed and compared in light of previous literature. Finally, the sixth chapter will 
conclude the research by presenting most significant conclusions and limitations of the 
study. New potential subjects of study will also be proposed. 
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2 Theoretical background 
 
In this section, previous literature and studies of sports economics, especially ones about 
European club football, will be discussed. The theoretical framework is built around five 
main pillars that are characteristic for European club football. These pillars are 1) most 
common revenue sources, 2) most important expenditures, 3) transfer markets, 4) clubs’ 
ownership and objectives, and finally 5) operational environment. Basics of the topics will 
be covered comprehensively, but even more importantly I’ll try to emphasize the meaning 
and impact that each pillar might have to the empirical part of the study, which especially 
studies the association between financial performance and sporting success of European 
football clubs. 
 
2.1 Three sources of revenue 
 
In the season 2015/2016 European football markets generated impressive revenues of 
€24.6 billion. Top-five leagues accounted for 54% the market, thus €13.4 billion. Largest 
portion of the sales is generated in England, as English Premier League alone accounted 
for 20% of the markets in terms of revenues. German Bundesliga reaches the second 
position with 11% of the markets, and it’s followed by Spanish La Liga with 10%, Italian 
Serie A with 8% and French Ligue 1 with 6%. (Deloitte, 2017a) 
 
Professional football took its first steps in England during the industrial revolution, when 
people started to have enough money and leisure time to watch games at the stadiums 
(Gerrard, 1999). Money and time are still the limiting factors in terms of people watching 
football, but nowadays thanks to the liberalization of broadcasting market and 
technological development (Gerrard, 2000), people don’t have to find their ways to the 
stadiums if they want to enjoy watching football. This development has raised concerns 
whether European football clubs can maintain their stadium attendance levels as number of 
live broadcasted matches is growing substantially (Kringstad, et al., 2018), and it has been 
suggested that in the future increased broadcast revenues could dominate decreased 
revenues from matchdays (Buraimo & Simmons, 2009). As number of broadcasted 
matches is growing, so is the revenue distributed to clubs from broadcast rights. In season 
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2015/2016 revenue from broadcast rights accounted for 49% of the revenues in top-five 
leagues. At the same time matchday sales accounted for 17%. (Deloitte, 2017a) Although 
importance of matchday sales is getting smaller especially for biggest leagues, stadium 
attendance is still of importance for the clubs, as it indicates also other things, such as 
interest that people have towards the club, which is actually often seen as a main revenue 
driver for any professional sport club (Neale, 1964). Stadium attendance is also found to be 
positively correlated with other revenue sources (Késenne, 2014). Third commonly 
classified revenue source besides matchday and broadcast right sales, is commercial 
revenue, which includes sponsorship deals and merchandise sales. In season 2015/2016, 
commercial revenue was the second largest income source for clubs in top-five leagues, as 
it accounted for 34% of the revenues (Deloitte, 2017a). Clubs’ ability to generate revenues 
from the three sources is affected by few key factors, e.g. stadium ownership, qualifying 
for UEFA competitions and connecting with fan base. 
 
There exist some differences between the top-five leagues in terms of grouping different 
revenue sources and what income is counted as revenue in the first place. Probably most 
used classification, which is for example used in popular Football Money League reports 
provided by Deloitte, includes all the revenue for previous mentioned three sources. There 
might be differences in the revenue classifications even inside the league, but the greatest 
differences between the leagues are either related with classifying of commercial revenue 
or treatment of player transfers. Classifying of commercial revenue isn’t really that 
remarkable issue, as leagues only differ in terms of whether particular revenues, e.g. 
advertising, is grouped to commercial revenue or treated as an own revenue source. On the 
other hand, treatment of transfer fees is of importance for this study, as it might affect the 
comparability of the clubs in terms of revenue. Hence, player transfers as a whole will be 
discussed later in this study, and the issue will be brought up then. Let’s now go through 
the three most commonly classified income sources in more detail, as they are in important 
position constituting the level of clubs’ consumption. 
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2.1.1 Matchday revenue 
 
Historically most important revenue source has been matchday sales, and it is still main 
income source for clubs participating in smaller leagues. Matchday sales consist of tickets 
and hospitality sales when the team is playing at their own stadium. In Europe’s top-five 
leagues, German Bundesliga is only one with 18 teams, as all other leagues have 20 teams. 
In each of the top-five leagues, every team faces each other two times, once at home and 
once away. Hence, Bundesliga teams have 17 home games in domestic league compared to 
19 home games for clubs in other leagues. Domestic league games are usually most 
important ones for generating matchday revenues, as these games are mostly played on 
weekends and stadiums are full of crowd. Several studies have found significant 
correlation between midweek games and lower number of spectators (e.g. Baimbridge, et 
al., 1996; García & Rodríguez, 2002; Forrest, et al., 2004; Buraimo & Simmons, 2009; 
Kringstad, et al., 2018). Still, there is only limited amount of home games that can be 
played on weekends in one season. Thus, midweek games are also in important role 
generating matchday income although attendance might be slightly lower. 
 
Domestic cup games as well as European cup games are mostly played on midweek, but 
these games might be of importance for particular fans and attendance could be rather 
high. Local fans might for instance have a special connection or emotion towards 
traditional domestic cups through historic achievements of the club. At the same time 
European cup games are enjoying high interest from football fans all over the world. 
Qualifying for European competition’s group stage means three more home games in the 
season, and if the team goes through from the group, every knockout stage means one 
more home game and important increase in matchday sales. In addition to domestic league 
games and cup games, teams often fill their calendars with friendlies and different 
testimonial matches, especially for the summer, when teams are preparing for next season. 
Often attendance in these games doesn’t reach as high as it is in competitive matches, but 
still some extra revenue could be gathered trough ticket sales and hospitality offered at the 
stadium. Hence, one key factor in acquiring matchday revenue is simply number of home 
games played each season. 
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Other key factors, besides number of home games, are naturally ticket prices and 
attendance, which are highly dependent on each other. Lower ticket prices lead to greater 
attendance and higher prices result in playing in front of empty stadiums. Attendance can 
be further divided to stadium capacity and utilization rate. Usually clubs are aiming to set 
prices on the level, where stadium capacity would be maximised with utilization rate near 
to 100 percent. Previous literature has found several factors that are positively correlating 
with attendance, and few of the most important are games played on weekend, derby 
matches and home games against greatest and most popular clubs in the league (e.g. 
Baimbridge, et al., 1996; Buraimo & Simmons, 2009; Pawlowski & Anders, 2012; 
Kringstad, et al., 2018). For example, in English Premier League season 2016/2017 there 
were eight teams that reached their highest attendance of the season, when historically the 
most successful club of the league, Manchester United, was visiting them (Premier League, 
2017a). 
 
Spectators are direct source for matchday revenue through ticket sales (Andreff & 
Staudohar, 2002), but matchday revenues are also generated from hospitality services at 
the stadiums, so it’s important to gather as much spectators as possible. Attendance is also 
an indirect driver for other revenue as well (Borland & Macdonald, 2003). Fans at the 
stands can be seen as part of a product that football clubs offer to their sponsors and media 
companies (Kringstad, et al., 2018), and that product suffers if the game is played in front 
of empty seats. 
 
Largest stadiums in Europe have a capacity of more than 75.000 and as these clubs are the 
most popular ones, the utilization rates are usually also high. Still not all of the popular 
teams have such big stands, as stadium enlargement requires remarkable capital 
investments and its benefits are gathered slowly in the long period of time. For example, 
Chelsea’s home avenue Stamford Bridge has capacity of around 42.000 and Paris Saint 
German’s stadium Parc des Princes’ capacity is around 41.000. These clubs are ranked 
very high on the list of Europe’s most popular clubs, but stadium capacities are far from 
the top. In the season 2016/2017 in English Premier League, the average attendance was 
nearly 36.000, but even more importantly average utilisation rate was impressive 96.5 
percent for the whole league, which could be seen as an indication of two important things. 
Firstly, interest towards attending Premier League matches is enormous, as there were only 
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three clubs (83.1% Hull City, 84.5% Sunderland and 88.9% West Bromwich Albion), 
which had utilisation rate under 90 percent (Premier League, 2017a). Secondly, clubs 
could have potential for extra matchday revenue through stadium enlargements, but those 
are still quite rarely implemented because of their high implementing costs and clubs’ risk 
of relegation from the league. 
 
One of the most important stakeholder for football club is their fans. Their importance is 
even emphasized when acquiring matchday revenue. This leads to situation where fans 
might use their power to influence the pricing of tickets. This is the case especially if fans 
can work or protest together against high pricing of tickets. At times, one can read from the 
media about fans protesting against high ticket prices, but the influence that these protests 
have or not have on ticket pricing isn’t really studied yet. 
 
Publics’ interest for attending games can be measured by few different indicators, such as 
tickets sold or number of audience in each game. Clubs often also measure the number of 
sold season tickets, as it especially indicates the interest amongst locals, who someone 
could describe as hard-core fans. Nowadays season ticket holders are also quite often 
selling their seats online for single games with profit, and some people might even build a 
small profitable business around it. This again indicates the high interest that people have 
towards the game, as they are willing to pay even more than the original price. 
 
Thus, when acquiring matchday revenue, clubs’ objectives should be: 
1. maximizing the number of home games, 
2. building public’s interest for the games and 
3. providing a good scale of hospitality services. 
The first two are highly dependent on club’s performance on the field, so one can actually 
already see how sporting success is connected with matchday revenues, although for 
instance, branding and great social media coverage could in addition have a positive 
impact on public’s interest. The third objective could be achieved without investments on 
the team and players itself, so it could be a cheap way for the clubs to promote their 
revenues if they haven’t already covered it. 
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2.1.2 Broadcast revenue 
 
Revenue from broadcast rights has grown to be the main income source for clubs 
participating in Europe’s largest leagues. Thanks to the liberalization of broadcasting 
market and technological development (Gerrard, 2000), people can nowadays watch 
football games from their living rooms and they’re not required to travel all the way to the 
stadium. This development has led to several studies of how broadcasting affects stadium 
attendance and matchday revenue. It’s easy to see the threatening substitution effect that 
broadcasts have over attendance, but the previous literature has also found complementary 
effects between the two. Interestingly increase in number of broadcasted matches seems to 
be problematic only for smaller leagues, where substitution effect works against them as 
people tend to watch broadcasted games from bigger leagues rather than attending on the 
game of local club. (Kringstad, et al., 2018) For instance, Forrest & Simmons (2006) found 
out that broadcasted UEFA Champions League matches affected negatively on the 
attendance in concurrent matches of League One and League Two in English football. 
Kringstad, et al. (2018) found the similar negative connection between broadcasted games 
in top-five leagues and Norwegian top division football. Interestingly for largest leagues, 
increase in the number of broadcasted games seems rather to be significant additional 
revenue driver (Solberg & Turner, 2010). 
 
Importance of broadcast rights has raised enormously in European club football, as 
deregulation in broadcasting markets led to increased competition and rise of broadcast 
right values (Solberg & Turner, 2010). Especially clubs in top-five leagues have benefitted 
greatly from the continuous growth in broadcast right values. During the last years, 
revenue gathered from selling the broadcast rights has grown substantially, and it already 
accounts approximately half of the total revenues generated in top-five leagues (Deloitte, 
2017a). 
 
Let’s go briefly through how clubs actually gain their income from broadcasting markets. 
So, each league organisation or competition holder owns the broadcasting rights for their 
own competition, and usually auction is held to sell those rights for highest bidder/bidders. 
In top-five leagues, Spanish La Liga was a long time an exception, as there each club 
negotiated their individual broadcasting contracts, but in 2016/17 they fully adopted quite 
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similar collective rights selling mechanism that’s also in use in other top-five leagues 
(Deloitte, 2017a). Normally rights are sold for a fixed period of time and separately for 
different geographic areas. Time periods are often quite short, as the competition holders 
want to benefit from the rising interest of public, which leads to higher bids and greater 
income. For example, in English Premier League, the time period is three seasons, and 
broadcast rights are sold all over the world separately for different locations. On the other 
hand, broadcast rights for smaller leagues are hard to sell abroad because the interest 
towards the league mostly exists in that particular country. Companies, who buy the 
broadcast rights, are aiming to make profitable business by selling a) broadcasts to the 
public and b) advertising space for other businesses. Thus, value of broadcast rights 
reflects the interest that public have towards the particular league, and to this point the 
process has been very much driven by market forces. 
 
When broadcast rights are sold, a competition holder has to decide how much and how to 
distribute the revenue fairly for the competing clubs. Thus, now market forces step aside, 
as league organisations or competition holders are deciding the distribution of the revenue. 
The most equal distribution in top-five leagues is currently in English Premier League, 
where at the moment the ratio between highest and lowest earning clubs is 1.61:1 (Premier 
League, 2017b). Traditionally Spanish La Liga has had most uneven distribution through 
individual broadcasting contracts. Lately there have been new broadcast arrangements 
especially in Germany, Italy and Spain (Deloitte, 2017a), and the movement has been 
towards more equal distribution. Hence, the ratios aren’t fixed and it’s up to league 
organisations to decide when it’s time for change. 
 
Normally most of the income is distributed to clubs, but part of it might be also used to 
cover some running costs or for the benefit of other important stakeholders. For example, 
in season 2015/2016 UEFA generated total revenues of €2.4 billion from its tournaments: 
Champions League, Europa League and Super Cup, although the latest only consists of one 
game between the winners of previous mentioned competitions. More than 80% of the 
revenues were generated by selling broadcasting rights and the rest were gained through 
commercial rights and matchday revenue. Of the total revenues, 73% was distributed to 
participating clubs, 10% was used to cover competition costs and slightly more than 8% 
was used for both, solidarity payments for non-qualified or non-participating clubs under 
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UEFA’s influence and general contribution to European football. (UEFA, 2017) Also 
domestic leagues often use part of the revenues for other stakeholders than participating 
clubs. For instance, in English Premier League so called “parachute” payments are made 
for clubs that were relegated from the league to soften the financial blow of relegation 
(Barajas, et al., 2005). 
 
For the largest competitions, distribution mechanism often consists of three different 
factors: 
1. equal share, 
2. facility fees and 
3. merit payments. 
Thus firstly, part of the revenue is shared equally for every competing club, which actually 
is highly important factor to retain some level of competitive balance in the competition, 
which gives chance also for smaller clubs to achieve sporting success. Secondly, facility 
fees are paid each time that club’s games are broadcasted. This element often rewards 
clubs basing on their popularity. People want to watch the games of their favourite clubs, 
and match schedules are even planned the way that most popular clubs are rarely playing 
concurrent matches. Some arguments could be made against this distributing element, 
because it might greaten the gap between largest and smallest clubs, and thus lead to 
competitive imbalance. Still this element is often seen as a fair one, since the total revenue 
gathered from distribution rights benefits greatly from the public’s interest towards most 
popular teams. Thirdly, merit payments are based on how well club performed on the 
competition, which is measured from the league table. Thus, this element directly connects 
sporting success with revenue. Hence, especially merit payments are of importance for the 
empirical part of this study, and even contributing factor behind some of the hypotheses. 
 
For instance, in English Premier League revenues from selling broadcast rights are 
distributed as follows. All of the international broadcast revenues are split equally among 
20 participating clubs. Also 50% of UK broadcast revenue is split equally. Then 25% of 
the UK broadcast revenue are paid in facility fees, and last 25% in merit payments. In 
season 2014/2015 equal share payments amounted to £54.1 million per club. Facility fees 
varied from £8.8 million to £21.5 million per club, and merit payments from £1.2 million 
to £24.9 million. In the end Chelsea gathered highest broadcast revenues of £99.0 million 
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and Queens Park Rangers lowest, £64.9 million. (Premier League, 2015) In comparison, 
French Ligue 1 has very similar mechanism to distribute broadcast revenues, but facility 
fees are replaced by payments that are based on club’s reputation and portion of equal 
share payments is much lower than what it is in English Premier League. In Season 
2015/2016 Paris Saint German received 10% of the total broadcast right revenue pot and at 
the same time GFC Ajaccio received only 2.1%. (LFP, 2017) On the basis of previous 
figures, it could be argued that distribution mechanism in English Premier League leads to 
more equal split between participating clubs in order to maintain more competitively 
balanced league. In comparison, mechanism in French Ligue 1 respects more market 
forces by rewarding most popular clubs, which leads to decreased competitive balance and 
wider financial gap between the best and the worst team. 
 
Besides previous stated factors that link sporting success and revenues together, also 
succeeding in UEFA’s club competitions leads to greater revenues through UEFA’s 
distributions. The base of the distribution mechanism is fixed amounts for each stage of the 
tournaments. In Champions League season 2015/2016 qualifying for group stage was 
worth of €12 million for every 32 competing clubs. Going through from the group meant 
additional €5.5 million. Then €6 million was paid for reaching quarter-finals, €7 million 
for semi-finals, €10.5 million for runner-up and €15 million for the winner. Thus, 
Champions League winner (Real Madrid CF in 2015/2016) received €45.5 million solely 
from fixed amounts paid for the winner. In addition to fixed amounts, clubs get bonus 
payments from their performance in the group stage. In season 2015/2016 clubs received 
€1.6 million for each win and €0.5 million for each draw in Champions League group 
stage. Third and last part of the distribution mechanism in UEFA’s club competitions is 
market pool payments, which amounted to 43% of the total distributions in Champions 
League season 2015/2016. Market pool shares in Champions League are in proportion to 
the value of broadcasting rights revenue within territory of their respective national 
associations. (UEFA, 2017) This element isn’t as straightforward as previous ones, and 
concrete calculations are missing in UEFA’s (2017) financial report, but final payments 
based on market pool are visible for each club, and they ranged from €2.5 million for 
Maccabi Tel-Aviv to €52.9 million for Juventus. 
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Latest rise of European club football has mostly come from continuous growth of 
broadcast right values, which also indicates the growth in public’s interest towards 
European football. Differences in public’s interest towards particular leagues are now 
shaping the financial power hierarchy between European football leagues. Especially 
English Premier League is leaving other leagues behind through impressive growth of 
broadcast right revenues. However, latest news are signalling inevitable end of growth 
becoming reality in the coming years, as domestic broadcast right deal for three successive 
seasons of English Premier League seems to come down from $7.14 billion (seasons 
2016/17 – 2018/19) to near of $6.33 billion (seasons 2019/20 – 2021/22) with still two 
minor game packages to be sold, and possible offers are expected from Facebook, Netflix 
and Amazon (Price; Forbes, 2018). Although domestic broadcasting markets might have 
reached its maximum in UK, there are still plenty of room for growth abroad, which could 
still lead to the superior dominance of English Premier League. In comparison of UK 
broadcast right deals, latest broadcast rights for UEFA’s club competitions were sold for 
€5.9 billion (seasons 2015/16 – 2017/18) (UEFA, 2017). 
 
In short period of time the financial dominance of one league might increase only financial 
gap between the leagues, but in longer period of time the financial superiority probably 
leads to sporting superiority of one league, which is actually very common in other sports 
(e.g. NBA in basketball, NFL in American football or NHL in ice hockey). This 
development would then of course threaten the competitive balance of UEFA’s club 
competitions, if one league becomes too dominant. At the moment we are still far from this 
to be realized, but competition holders and league organisations play a key role in 
maximizing their respective broadcast right revenues and distributing it for the sake of 
developing their own competitions. 
 
2.1.3 Commercial revenue 
 
Third and possibly most significant revenue source for the clubs in the future, is usually 
referred as a commercial source. Most important commercial sources are sponsorship and 
merchandising. These two are highly dependent on club’s popularity. Mostly followed 
clubs get greatest sponsorship deals as the coverage is highest. At the same time, the most 
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popular teams have also largest numbers of fans that will spend their money on club 
merchandise. This study already found links between revenues, popularity and sporting 
success of the club with previous two revenue sources. Commercial revenue even further 
emphasizes the association by especially connecting revenues with club’s popularity. 
Manchester United is a good example of a club that is highly benefitting from their 
popularity in terms of commercial revenue. On pitch, the performance in the last years 
hasn’t been as good as before, but their position as a leading global sports brand has still 
protected club’s ability to generate greater commercial revenues as their domestic rivals 
(Deloitte, 2017b). Thus, it could be argued that increasing club’s popularity is the best way 
to increase revenue from commercial sources. 
 
Although commercial revenue is connected with club’s popularity, it is also the one source 
of revenue that has most in common with other businesses than sport clubs, and many 
clubs actually have potential for growth when it comes to commercialising their 
businesses. Higher revenue from sponsorship and merchandising could be reached e.g. by 
developing club’s brand or expanding into new markets by increasing interest towards the 
club through summer tours to different continents etc. Hence, there are also plenty of other 
ways to increase club’s commercial revenue in addition to achieving sporting success. 
Thus, it would be beneficial to concentrate also on commercial side of the club, and major 
benefits could be received through innovative commercial solutions. 
 
Sponsorship deals have traditionally been shown to public through logos on the jerseys or 
advertisements at the stadium. This is still the case, but nowadays also clubs’ popularity in 
social media is more and more used in sponsorship collaborations and also club’s premises 
are often named through major partners. Slightly different sponsorship contracts have also 
been done for a long time, where clubs commit to use equipment from solely one particular 
company. Often that company will benefit from the deal in addition to increased visibility 
by operating as a supplier for club’s merchandise. Kit deals are most valuable example of 
previous described cooperation, and brands like Adidas and Nike are competing to make 
deals with most popular football clubs. For example, a 10-year-long kit deal between 
Manchester United and Adidas has been effective since the beginning of season 2015/16, 
and it sees Adidas paying £750 million to Manchester United. At the same time Adidas 
expects to generate £1.5 billion through kit sales of Manchester United. The example well 
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describes the market size of merchandising, especially for most popular clubs (Sale & 
Lawton; Daily Mail, 2014), but it also presents the growing potential that exists for smaller 
clubs as well. In comparison to equipment deal, Manchester United also made seven-year 
long kit deal with Chevrolet at the beginning of season 2014/15. In that deal Chevrolet 
pays $80 million per year for Manchester United to keep logo of Chevrolet on the chest of 
their shirt (Smith; Forbes, 2016). 
 
The product mix that largest clubs have on merchandising is extensive, and their online 
stores provide wide range of products where to choose. Largest clubs benefit from their 
popularity also in merchandise sales, and they are able to promote the products with help 
of highly admired superstar players. Products are sold all over the world to the places 
where fans are willing to show their support for the club. Hence, clubs who have strong 
international fan base are mostly benefitting in terms of higher merchandise revenues. 
 
2.2 Expenditures dominated by wages 
 
Although European football clubs have continuously managed to grow their revenues for a 
number of years, at the same time their costs have increased, and financial performance 
declined (e.g. Storm & Nielsen, 2012; Morrow, 2014). Clubs tend to compete with each 
other by hiring new players at rising prices (Solberg & Haugen, 2010). In this chapter, I 
will go through the most important costs of football clubs, why clubs tend to overspend, 
and what it means that wages are strongly correlating with sporting success. 
 
The basic cost structure of a sport club is quite similar in all sports. The most important 
item of expenditure is players’ and managers’ wages. Other costs are usually related to 
operating or financing, but their impacts on clubs’ profitability are often quite limited in 
comparison to wages. Operating costs often include items such as matchday expenses, cost 
of materials, sales and marketing, depreciation and rent of facilities, write-down of 
goodwill, administration etc. Financial costs are dependent on club’s ownership and how 
they decide to finance club’s operations. In addition to personnel, operating and finance 
costs, clubs also might make remarkable capital investments for example to increase 
stadium capacity or to improve training facilities. Finally, tax gains and losses are also 
influencing the profitability of the clubs. 
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Importance of personnel expenses differs between sports and leagues, but in every sport, 
wages are at the centre of club’s operations. In professional sports, players’ and managers’ 
wages should be seen as a production cost instead of personnel expense. Sport clubs are 
producing match events, and people are spending their money to participate in the event 
either at the stadium or through broadcasts. Thus, players at the field and managers just 
outside the field could be seen as production elements, and without them the end product 
of sports game couldn’t be played. 
 
The importance of wages is even emphasized in European football, where salary caps 
don’t exist, and it’s easy to argue that wages have grown far beyond what would be for the 
good of the clubs. In season 2015/16, clubs in top-five European leagues used on average 
61% of their revenues to cover personnel expenses (Deloitte, 2017a). The emphasized 
importance of wages in European football actually leads to increased risks of running the 
profitable football club, as clubs’ spending levels are very much primarily determined 
already at the beginning of the season (Terrien, et al., 2017). Income level is dependent on 
the sporting success, but large investments on the playing talent don’t guarantee wins on 
the field, but ties club’s money to personnel expenses. Huge investment on one player 
contains lots of risks and the investment can fail if the player gets injured or underperforms 
(Kedar-Levy & Bar-Eli, 2008). Thus, if the team as whole doesn’t perform as well as 
expected, the budgeted revenues might not be generated to cover already set spending 
level. Hence, the growth of wages has often been found to be the reason behind clubs’ 
insolvency problems (e.g. Buraimo, et al., 2006). 
 
When clubs are maximizing their on-pitch performance and revenues, they are at the same 
time maximizing their players’ wages. These three things are tied to each other. The 
positive correlation between wages and sporting success has been acknowledged since the 
beginning of research in sports economics (e.g. Rottenberg, 1956; Scully, 1974). Higher 
wages lead to more talented players, which in turn increases clubs’ popularity and on-pitch 
performance. These things again lead to greater sponsorship deals, merchandise sales and 
higher stadium utilization rates. One could picture European football clubs’ business as a 
kind of vicious circle. You have to spend money to get money, but the problem is that 
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getting money isn’t as simple as spending it. Highly paid players don’t guarantee greater 
on-pitch performances and revenues, but they increase club’s chances to achieve those. 
Kuper & Szymanski (2014) have studied the correlation between wages and league 
positions couple of times for English football clubs. First study included data from 1978 to 
1997 and second study was conducted for time period 2003-2012. In both studies they 
found clear correlation between wages and league positions, with wages explaining more 
than 90 percent of clubs’ positioning in the league table. Thus, in long term, clubs who are 
able to attract talented players by offering higher wages, seem to achieve greater success 
on the field. It should be noticed that these studies used both logarithmic and average 
values over the years for both league position and wages. Hence, it was possible to 
compare the leagues and to get such strong results. 
 
The strong connection between wages and sporting success is of importance for this 
research for couple of reasons. Firstly, wages are fixed for short-term, but sporting success 
varies and is partly dependent on pure luck. Thus, in short-term the connection might alter 
a lot. Secondly, it has been found that European football clubs’ revenues and expenses are 
positively correlated, and as wages are clearly the most significant cost item, the 
correlation exists also between revenues and wages (e.g. Barajas, et al., 2005). Thus, 
actually all of the three; revenues, wages and sporting success are positively correlating 
with each other especially in the long-term. Thirdly, the strong connection between the 
three in the long-term leads to question the connection between sporting success and 
operating profit. Higher revenues could lead to greater operating profit, but higher wages 
on the other hand decrease the operating profit. As these both are correlating with each 
other and also with the sporting success, it’s highly interesting to investigate further the 
connection between operating profit and sporting success. 
 
2.3 Transfer markets 
 
In addition to emphasized importance of wages, transfer markets also play important role 
in clubs’ expenditures, but they also provide possibility for clubs to generate extra income. 
One of the most famous sport publications of all, Moneyball: The Art of Winning an 
Unfair Game by Lewis (2003) tells the story how innovative ways to understand sports, in 
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this case baseball, can be exploited through transfer markets. Importance of well-
functioning transfer markets is emphasized especially for smaller teams with strict budgets, 
since it offers them an excellent way to generate extra income. 
 
Transfer markets in European club football are substantially different than respective 
markets in many other sports, especially in major American leagues, where players can be 
traded for drafting rights and their old contracts are valid also in the acquiring club. In 
European football, the acquiring club pays agreed transfer fee for the selling club, after 
which player’s old contract is terminated, and new contract negotiated with the acquiring 
club (Kuper & Szymanski, 2014). Fédération Internationale de Football Association 
(FIFA) regulates transfer markets, which are open twice a year for limited time in top-five 
European leagues. Main transfer window opens at the end of the season and closes couple 
weeks after the season has started. Second window opens at the beginning of the year and 
closes at the end of January. Even between top-five leagues, there exist slight differences 
in opening and closing dates and timings, but their importance is relatively low. Transfer 
markets in European club football experienced a tremendous change in 1995 through 
Bosman ruling. It gave players a freedom of movement and as a consequence, players have 
enjoyed of remarkably stronger bargaining position since that (A.T. Kearney, 2010). 
 
In accounting point of view, players are clubs’ assets, which are traded between clubs in 
the liquid markets. Hence, the comparisons between transfer markets and stock markets 
could be purposeful, at least to some extent. Under UK GAAP and IFRS, clubs are 
required to capitalize transfer fees on the balance sheet as intangible fixed assets. The 
capitalized amount will then be amortised over the player’s contract period. Thus, this 
actually leads to situation where only values of acquired players are visible in the club’s 
balance sheet for the period of their initial contract. Market values of “home-grown” 
players are excluded from intangible assets, as there isn’t any acquisition cost that could be 
capitalized. (Deloitte, 2017a) 
 
Transfer fees are the costs that media and public are probably most interested in for two 
reasons. Firstly, the money spent on transfers have grown substantially, and remarkable 
amounts are paid for single players. Secondly, transfers are in the key role determining 
club’s sporting performance and possibilities to success. As the club acquires new players, 
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the end product of football game changes, and public is highly interested in these changes. 
In the media, there exists lots of speculation about possible transfers and how they could 
affect clubs’ possibilities to success. Especially most of the fans want to see their favourite 
club acquiring new superstar players and achieving sporting success with help of their 
actions on the field. On the other hand, for some fans it might be even more satisfying to 
see local lads rising from youth academies to the first team. Although transfer fees are 
linked with club’s sporting performance, it seems that there’s no empirical evidence that 
higher transfer fees would necessarily lead to greater sporting success. Kuper & Szymanski 
(2014) studied the correlation between net transfer spending and league position for 40 
English football clubs during years 1978-1997 and found that net transfer spending 
explained only 16 percent of variations in league positions. Hence, they argue that on the 
long-term clubs who act as net buyers on the transfer market, won’t succeed remarkably 
better than net seller clubs. However, it could be argued that 16 percent is still somewhat 
significant factor, and that the study should be repeated, since it’s questionable if 20 to 40-
year-old data still represents the truth. Actually, in the study of A.T. Kearney (2010), it’s 
argued that strong correlation exists between net transfer spending and sporting success 
during 2008-2010 in top-five leagues. However, the sporting success is quite questionably 
measured by UEFA’s yearly country scores instead of actual positions, points or other 
direct sporting success measure. However, it seems that the explaining power of transfer 
costs to sporting success is less significant as what was the case with wages in previous 
chapter. 
 
In sports economics, there exists various studies of transfer markets. Especially players’ 
market values and transfer fees paid in actual trades have been of interest for numerous 
researchers. Traditionally the focus has been on player performance and characteristics, 
and how they influence paid transfer fees. Frick (2007) for instance, finds that transfer fees 
are positively influenced by higher number of goals scored and games played by the 
player. It was also found that at least in English Premier League and German Bundesliga, 
also experience, number of international caps and position in the field determine player’s 
value. Gulbrandsen & Gulbrandsen (2011) use slightly different approach and state that 
club owners are looking to acquire players, who can by their own effort enhance the 
sporting performance of the club enough to reach position that ensures the qualification for 
UEFA’s club competitions. They introduce complete pricing framework, where player’s 
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value is influenced by the added value that player brings to the club. Hence, also other 
things than player’s performance, for example ability to increase attendance, have 
influence on player’s value. Investments on players are also evaluated in numerous 
different ways. If the club is more interested in maximizing wins instead of profits, they 
should use sporting success indicators to evaluate their investment. 
 
Transfer markets are of importance for the study between financial performance and 
sporting success. They are in special role for football clubs working as a balancing factor 
between financial and sporting performance, but also between income and expenditures. 
Although, the direct correlation between higher transfer fees and greater sporting success is 
found to be weak, it still exists. For largest clubs, net impact of player transfers is usually 
negative, as they tend to overinvest on players in hopes of achieving greater sporting 
success. These clubs aren’t investing in players to get financially positive return on the 
invest, but instead they are often more interested to achieve positive return in terms of 
sporting success. One reason for overinvesting in players is the short-term nature of club’s 
objectives. In European club football there seems to be in overall too much player trades in 
comparison to what would be optimum for many clubs. Pressure that comes from fans, 
owners and managers have led to situation where transfers are made too often without 
paying enough attention to trading costs. Purposeful comparison could be made with stock 
exchange, where too high emphasis on short-term returns lead to unnecessary high trading 
costs. Financially the situation is very similar in football transfer markets, where players 
are traded too often in hopes of getting short-term returns in terms of sporting success. In 
addition to situation in stock exchange, football clubs also often underestimate the indirect 
trading costs that arise when objectives are dependent on sporting success. Players are 
living assets of the club, and only by working well together they can achieve sporting 
success. Clubs should pay attention to these aspects if they want to minimize the effect of 
indirect trading costs. 
 
In comparison to largest clubs, for bit smaller clubs, player transfers act as an excellent 
way to generate extra income by selling players, when they are overvalued by the markets, 
and to seek for players that are undervalued. Players’ short time form is sometimes found 
to affect the market valuation too much, so it might be financially beneficial to sell players 
right after they have had an exceptional season at the club. Numerous other inefficiencies 
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have also been found in transfer markets. Kuper & Szymanski (2014) for example mention 
the influence of good performance in World Cup, player’s nationality and external 
irrelevant features as factors that are influencing the transfer fees, although they don’t 
affect sporting performances. These inefficiencies are often argued to be the consequence 
of holding on to traditional scouting instead of putting more emphasis on data-analysis. 
 
There are lots of great examples of the clubs that have used transfer markets as their main 
tool to raise the status of the club. Olympique Lyon from years 2002 to 2008 is one of the 
best examples where the club used its extraordinary skills on the transfer markets and 
achieved great success on the field. Previously unknown small club won French Ligue 1 
remarkably seven times in a row and became the greatest club in France at the time (e.g. 
Kuper & Szymanski, 2014). One of the newest example on the other hand, is the club 
owner Matthew Benham and his innovative way to model football and exploit transfer 
markets in his clubs, Brenftord FC and FC Midtjylland. (e.g. Tippett, 2017). Common 
factor in the numerous examples of clubs exploiting transfer markets seems to be that these 
clubs are often quite small, and they are able to achieve competitive advantage over 
competitors at the time they are growing. When the club has risen to the highest stage and 
is competing to sign the top players in the world of football, the advantage disappears or at 
least decreases significantly. Main cause seems to be the extra high valuation of top 
players, which is natural result of top clubs overinvesting in players, as they are chasing 
sporting success in most valued competitions. 
 
In respect to this study, probably most important issue about player transfers is their 
treatment in accounting and more specially differences in the treatment between countries. 
As already clarified, under UK GAAP and IFRS, clubs are required to capitalize transfer 
fees on the balance sheet as intangible assets. Each year similar amount of the capitalized 
transfer fee will be amortised. Hence, at the end of the contract the total value of transfer 
fee is amortised from the balance sheet. If the player is further sold during his contract, the 
capitalized amount will be written-down. At this point the process is clear and quite similar 
in all of the top-five leagues, but questions arise by looking at each leagues’ financial 
reports, which are built by combining reports of each participating club. Unfortunately, I 
don’t have direct access to clubs’ financials, as in empirical part of this study I’m leaning 
on financial information gathered from Orbis –database. In each league’s combined 
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financial reports, there seems to be differences on how clubs record transfer income in 
each league. In respect to this study, it’s highly important that in income statements of all 
clubs both transfer income and amortisations are included in operating profit, which seems 
to be the case. Unfortunately, the case might not be as simple with revenue. On the basis of 
combined financial reports, there could be two different ways of recording transfer income. 
Either transfer income is reported as revenue or just before operating profit as 
profits/losses on disposal of players’ registration. Latter seems to be more in line with UK 
GAAP and IFRS, and it could be the case that only league organisations have purposefully 
reported clubs’ transfer income as revenue to promote the financial position of their own 
league. Still through restricted access to financial data, I can’t be completely sure whether 
this effect the comparability of clubs’ revenues, so this should be kept in mind especially 
in comparisons between the leagues. 
 
2.4 Objectives of the European football clubs 
 
This part of theoretical framework contains the most important theory content that is 
highly relevant to acknowledge when analysing the empirical results of this study. The 
chapter starts by discussion about two of the most important objectives of football clubs, 
how these objectives are affecting clubs’ operations, and what impact the ownership 
structure of the club has on its objectives. Afterwards the discussion moves on to previous 
studies and their findings on association between clubs’ financial performance and sporting 
success. 
 
2.4.1 Maximizing sporting success or profits? 
 
Sport clubs are very different from “ordinary companies” in many other industries. 
Rottenberg (1956) was the first one to model production function of a sport team, as he 
assumed that clubs participating in Major League Baseball were more oriented towards 
profit maximization instead of solely maximizing sporting success. Since that, the topic 
whether sport clubs are maximizing sporting success or profits have been probably the 
most studied one in sports economics, and previous literature is mainly assuming that club 
owners are either more oriented towards maximizing profits or sporting success (Sloane, 
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2015). Probably most important factor behind clubs’ objectives is its owners’ utility 
function, which is personal for each individual (see e.g. von Neumann & Morgenstern, 
1944). The function is usually combination of various objectives, and people tend to have 
different approaches when the consequences of their decisions are dependent on different 
risks to materialize, which is especially the case for sport clubs. In other lines of business, 
and in personal life mostly common approach towards risk is risk aversion, where risks are 
mostly avoided already in decision making. As already seen from previously discussed 
finances of football clubs, club owners rarely tend to avoid risks, and instead many of them 
could have neutral approach to the risk or they could even be categorised as risk lovers, 
who are willing to take additional risks with low or even negative expected return (see e.g. 
Pratt, 1964). Thus, football club owners’ utility function might include both financial and 
sporting objectives and any other objectives as well. Each owner of football club has 
personal utility function with various objectives, and in addition club owners also have 
their personal approach towards risks. Unfortunately, in previous literature sporting 
success seems to be sometimes referred as utility, which might be quite misleading, but in 
this study the term utility is used only to indicate club owners’ utility function. 
 
Demsetz & Lehn (1985) stated that professional sport clubs and mass media firms are quite 
similar in terms of profit maximization. Owners of companies in both industries might 
achieve higher utility by winning e.g. the World Series or influencing public opinion 
instead of solely maximizing profits. Since owners of professional sport clubs and mass 
media firms have often quite different utility functions than owners of firms in other 
industries, it’s only natural that companies in these two industries have also higher 
ownership concentration, which makes it easier for the owners to maximize their personal 
utility functions by managing their firms more closely. 
 
Sloane (1971) argued that European football club owners are mostly maximizing utility 
instead of sole profit maximization. At the time, English football clubs were repeatedly 
reporting deficits, which also led to other popular topic of research that studies the 
reasoning behind persistent losses and association between ownership structure and clubs’ 
performance (e.g. Leach & Szymanski, 2015; Wilson et al., 2013). Szymanski (2012) 
suggests that it might be club owners’ irrational exuberance, which encourages them to 
overinvest in playing talent in hopes of achieving sporting success. Vrooman (2007) on the 
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other hand argues that in the upper extreme it is the hope of reaching Champions League 
revenue and in lower extreme to avoid relegation that causes European football clubs to 
maximize wins instead of profits. Moral hazard of football club’s owners should also be 
considered, as clubs are often highly important for local community (Storm, 2012). The 
city, local companies, fans, creditors or other beneficing parties could step up and save the 
club from bankrupt. For example, Lago, et al. (2006) argue that local government in Spain 
would bail out certain clubs before they would end up in bankruptcy. 
 
However, too high expectations for the club to achieve sporting success are often followed 
by underperformance of the team on the field, which could lead to negative productivity 
and demand shocks, and actually Szymanski (2012) suggests that this is even more 
important factor behind persistent losses than owners’ behaviour. Still owners’ importance 
shouldn’t be underestimated because they might have numerous different objectives also in 
their other businesses that might not be related anyways to running a football club, but the 
coverage or the popularity of their club might contribute to achieving these other 
objectives and thus increase owner’s utility. Club owners could also allow unprofitability 
for short time if there’s a chance that it leads to higher revenues, for example from 
achieving a spot from Champions League. Thus, even intentional financial losses are not 
always irrational (Terrien, et al., 2017). 
 
Estimating the potential trade-off between maximizing sporting success or profit is highly 
important topic for sports economics (Fort, 2015), as it could lead to improved league 
systems and more efficient regulatory tools (Szymanski & Késenne, 2004). Still the 
operations of sport clubs aren’t so simple that they could be divided to only these two 
objectives, and although some studies have tried to find combinations of the two objectives 
by studying behaviours of sport clubs, only few attempts have been made to deeply 
understand professional sport clubs’ organizational objectives (Leach & Szymanski, 2015). 
Other important objectives are for instance related to corporate social responsibilities, 
attendance of the public, financial health of the league and market share/coverage of the 
club. Especially the latter could be highly beneficial for the club owners to promote their 
other businesses. Thus, although trade-off between sporting success and profit is in the 
core of the football clubs’ operations, other objectives should be considered as well, and 
their impacts shouldn’t be underestimated. In this study, the focus will be on the relation of 
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financial and sporting success, which goes hand in hand with the club owners’ objectives 
to maximize profits or sporting success. Hence, I will strive into that topic, but the big 
picture of numerous different objectives should be kept in mind as well. 
 
Trade-offs between profit and sporting success are usually divided to three different 
objective combinations that have been found to be used by professional sport clubs: 
1. profit maximization under sporting constraint, 
2. sporting success maximization under hard budget constraint and 
3. sporting success maximization under soft budget constraint. 
Club owner’s main decision is whether to maximize profits or sporting success, whereas 
constraints may be dependent also on environmental conditions. (Terrien, et al., 2017) 
There are only limited possibilities for football clubs to participate in different 
competitions, which limits the revenues that could be generated from playing more games 
and in different competitions. Also, budget constraints can be set by external actor, for 
instance UEFA demands that their Financial Fair Play Regulations are followed (Franck, 
2015). 
 
Differences between continents are commonly roughly divided the way that sport clubs in 
American leagues are more oriented towards profit maximization, as European clubs are 
more aggressively maximizing sporting success under either hard or soft budget (e.g. Fort, 
2000; Garcia-del-Barro & Szymanski, 2006; Dejonghe & Van Opstal, 2010; Terrien, et al., 
2017). Szymanski & Zimbalist (2005) state that the commonly known difference has 
mainly be born because the degree of the competitive balance differs between continents. 
Competitive balance will be discussed further in the next chapter, but it has been stated 
that American leagues are more competitively balanced than European leagues, and that 
the difference is coming from dissimilar league systems in terms of openness of the league, 
salary caps, draft systems etc. Szymanski & Késenne (2004) go even further by suggesting 
that open league system in Europe leads to a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, where risk 
of relegation encourages clubs to overinvest in playing talent (to read more about game 
theory and Nash equilibrium, see e.g. von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944; Nash, 1951). 
Storm (2012) even argues that there’s no appropriate theoretical approach or in-depth 
analysis that could be used to study the European football clubs’ tendency to maximize 
sporting success instead of maximizing profits. On the other hand, Wilson, et al. (2013) 
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suggest that European club football is more interesting field for the potential investors to 
enter because clubs’ operations aren’t as restricted as it is the case in American leagues.  
 
Although debate between profit and sporting success maximization has numerous 
empirical and theoretical studies, it seems that there isn’t unanimity or clear conclusions 
that supports one hypothesis over the other (Leach & Szymanski, 2015). Terrien, et al. 
(2017) figured that this might be because of both objectives are coexisting within a league, 
so they studied the objectives of French Ligue 1 clubs over the period of 2005/2006 – 
2014/2015. Their findings and detailed analysis show that it’s quite common for clubs to 
alter their objectives from year to year, and that there isn’t a single weighting between 
profit and sporting success objectives in professional football league. Some part of the 
alterations between objectives is explained by changes in the club. For example, new 
owner might totally change the emphasis between these two objectives, but still changes 
from one objective to another are found even without that clear reasons. Although the 
results of the study by Terrien et al. (2017) are highly interesting and analysis is 
convincing, it could be questioned whether realized operating profit percentages can truly 
tell whether the clubs are maximizing profits or sporting success under hard or soft budget 
constraints. Hamil and Walters (2010) argue that the whole industry of English football is a 
not-for-profit industry for club owners and that only other stakeholders, such as players, 
partners, media companies, etc. can make profit in the industry. On the other hand, Wilson, 
et al. (2013) argue that UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Regulations might change clubs’ 
objectives towards profit maximization in the future. 
 
2.4.2 The influence of ownership model 
 
While discussing about clubs’ objectives, it should be recognised and even emphasized by 
whom these objectives are stated. The ownership of the club has great impact on the 
objectives, which managers, players and all the other employees of the club are trying to 
reach. Hamil & Chadwick (2010) classifies three types of ownership models that are 
present in English Premier League: stock market model, supporter trust model of 
ownership and foreign ownership. Stock market model was popular in 1980s and 1990s, 
when most of the teams listed on stock markets and they received lots of interest from the 
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public. Just few years later it was found that stock market might not be the best fit for 
football clubs, as their financial returns for investments were quite poor and investors 
could easily find better value for their money. The problem that investors faced was that 
very rarely football clubs’ first objective was to generate income for their owners. The 
share trading of football clubs was almost non-existent since they received only low 
demand from institutional investors and at the same time supporters of the club were 
reluctant to sell their shares as there were often emotional reasons attached to owning 
shares. This led to illiquid secondary markets (Morrow, 1999), and numerous de-listings 
were conducted. Currently, only Arsenal and Manchester United could be classified under 
stock market model in English Premier League. As number of European football clubs 
listed on stock markets is relatively low, many studies have replaced stock market model 
with public ownership, which in addition to stock market model includes also public 
limited companies. 
 
Supporter trust model is characterized by independent, not-for-profit and cooperatively 
owned organisation. It aims to improve supporters’ influence on governance of the club 
and the model is common for smaller clubs, but its applicability for larger clubs have been 
questioned. Wilson, et al. (2013) argue that entities in largest football leagues of Europe 
should be instead using corporate finance. Hence, in their research the supporter trust 
model is replaced with domestic ownership. This is especially the case in English Premier 
League, where very rarely clubs could be classified under supporter trust model of 
ownership. Instead domestic ownership is still somewhat common, and these owners tend 
to have similar emotional attachment to the club as supporters have (Marmo, 2014). 
Domestic ownership has traditionally been very common for clubs participating in Italian 
Serie A, and although some movement towards foreign ownership has been seen (e.g. AS 
Roma & FC Internazionale), most of the domestic owners might not be willing to sacrifice 
the brand benefits that they or their companies achieve from owning a football club. 
 
Recent trend in club ownership models in top-five leagues has been towards foreign 
ownership, as wealthy investors are willing to buy clubs without paying too much attention 
to the price. It’s interesting that foreign investors very rarely come from other European 
countries. Instead it’s the US –businessmen, that have seen the real business potential 
especially in Premier League clubs. Recently the trend also seems to be increasingly 
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towards Asian owners, and investors in the rich Gulf states (Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Qatar and 
Bahrain) are showing their interest towards European club football through both ownership 
and sponsorship to expand their brands and increase their visibility around the world. 
Financial Fair Play Regulations introduced by UEFA might also increase the interest that 
investors have towards European club football, as regulations limit the risks that a club 
owner is facing. As already discussed, foreign owners often have additional objectives of 
their own that might not have nothing to do with football itself, but they want to benefit 
from the global coverage of the club and the league. The beneficial body might be the 
investor itself through his/her personal brand or investor’s company or even a whole 
country. Wilson, et al. (2013) argue that foreign owners more often than not swift club’s 
emphasis towards sporting success maximization. Clubs are seeking for foreign investors 
to help with their financing needs, which are often fulfilled in the short-term when foreign 
owners take over. In the long-term it should be questioned whether foreign owners’ 
tendency to maximize wins at the cost of profit is for the good of the club. 
 
From the top-five leagues, German Bundesliga seems to be most suspicious about external 
investors taking over the charge of clubs. The acquisition of the controlling stake in a club 
is limited to the registered membership association. Bundesliga clubs have to follow so 
called “50+1” rule, which states that majority of club’s shares have to be owned by its 
members. Hence, foreign investors can’t acquire controlling stakes in Bundesliga clubs, 
which reduces their attractiveness as an investment. Couple of exceptions to this rule 
however exist. First of all, an alleviation to the rule states that a person or company, which 
has supported the club financially over 20 years, can acquire the major ownership. 
(Kindler, 2014) Thus, Dietmar Hopp was allowed to acquire majority of Hoffenheim’s 
shares. Secondly, Bayer 04 Leverkusen and Vfl Wolfsburg were originally set up by 
private companies Bayer and Volkswagen, respectively, and they were allowed to keep the 
majority ownership in their clubs. 
 
There is also other evidence that giant international companies are interested in owning a 
Bundesliga club, which could signal that running a German football club is actually seen as 
a profitable business itself. These companies have to justify their investments in football 
clubs, and it’s hard to see that investments would be approved with negative expected 
returns. One example is Red Bull, which founded RB Leipzig in 2009 and they’ve run the 
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club without breaking the 50+1 rule. The rule has also received some critique about 
companies bending it in practice and that the Bundesliga gives advantage to other football 
leagues in Europe by not accepting the external equity from investors. 
 
Until 1998, clubs participating in Spanish La Liga, were strictly bound by the rule that only 
Spanish nationalities can own shares in Spanish football clubs. These restrictions were 
removed in 1998, and since that the foreign investors have invested also in Spanish 
football (Llopis-Goig, 2014). Foreign investors have also found French football and 
especially Paris Saint German and AS Monaco have risen to dominate Ligue 1 with the 
help of their wealthy investors. 
 
Marmo (2014) argue in her study of English Premier League during seasons 2009/10 – 
2012/13 that the ownership structure of the club influences the transfer fees that are paid to 
acquire players and also financial ratios of the club. For instance, billionaire ownership 
was found to increase clubs’ revenues by 48% on average. At the same time these clubs are 
paying 16% premium in their transfers and their profitability decreases by 48%. Respective 
figures were parallel, but slightly lower with foreign ownership, whereas opposite results 
were obtained with public ownership. In their study, Wilson, et al. (2013) discover that 
domestic ownership is better for the clubs’ financial performance, but on the other hand 
foreign ownership has led to greater sporting success. Still, the stock ownership model 
seems to be the most efficient one, as these clubs are achieving both financial and sporting 
success in the long-term. 
 
2.4.3 The association between financial performance and sporting success 
 
There exists unfortunately quite little previous research and empirical results on the 
correlation between clubs’ financial performance and sporting success. Especially the 
connection between clubs’ profitability and sporting success hasn’t received enough 
attention in academic research. Recently this topic should’ve grown to be one of the most 
important ones in European club football, as more and more emphasis has been given to 
clubs’ profitability. In this chapter, I will go through the most important discussion and the 
results about the connections, as these form the basis for the empirical part of this study. 
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The research methods in previous studies vary, but what is common for most of them is 
that relationship between revenue and sporting success seems to be positive, but the cause 
and effect relations between the two stays unclear. Arnold (1991) conducted one of the 
first empirical studies of the subject and found clear connection between the sporting 
success and revenues in English football clubs from 1905 to 1985. Szymanski & Kuypers 
(1999) found that more than 80% of the change in club’s income is explained by its league 
position, when they studied English football in 1978-1997. They also concluded that 
winning teams are attracting higher incomes. Some evidence has been also provided that 
the connection between revenues and sporting success isn’t that clear. For instance, Haas, 
et al. (2004) studied German football clubs and found that clubs’ efficiency isn’t 
correlating with sporting success. Still, it has been quite generally accepted in academic 
research that sporting success and revenues are positively correlating with each other. 
 
Barajas, et al. (2005) found clear connection between expected income and sporting 
success for Spanish football clubs in 1998-2002, but at the same time they found strong 
correlation between clubs’ revenues and expenses. Hence, the clear relation between 
sporting success and profitability of the clubs couldn’t be found. The strong correlation 
between revenues and expenses is easy to understand, since clubs spend lots of money to 
buy players in the hope of achieving sporting success, which in turn is a prerequisite for 
increasing income (Szymanski & Kuypers, 2000). 
 
In overall, the causality between revenues and sporting success has been difficult topic to 
study. At this point, it should be quite clear that the relation is two-sided. Higher revenues 
lead to greater sporting success and greater sporting success leads to higher revenues. The 
difficulty comes when trying to conduct exact estimations of the influence that the two 
have over each other. One of the main issues is the significant impact that luck has for 
short-term sporting success. Football is a game, where just couple of random events and 
their outcomes can separate winner from runner-up or whether the club is relegated or not. 
In comparison to other sports, such as basketball or ice-hockey, football games consist of 
very few scoring opportunities and games are often decided by only one goal. This 
emphasizes the impact of luck, and also tides the luck with club’s revenues. Hence, it 
could be argued that the field where football clubs are operating is quite harsh, as the luck 
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has so huge impact on club’s operations and performance. Barajas, et al. (2005) argue that 
the found relationship between sporting success and revenues might constitute a virtuous 
circle, where sporting success increases revenues, which could again be used to improve 
sporting performances. The problem is that the virtuous circle doesn’t include clubs’ 
profitability. Clubs tend to use even more money than what is generated to improve their 
sporting performances. 
 
Most of the previous research has measured sporting success by the results achieved in 
domestic league (e.g. Dobson & Goddard, 1998; Gerrard, 2005; Barros & Leach, 2006). 
Haas (2003), Haas, et al. (2004) and Zuber, et al. (2005) in addition consider also 
participation in European competitions through dummy variable in their models. Barajas, 
et al. (2005) on the other hand created their own index to measure the sporting success in 
various competitions at the same time. Samagaio, et al. (2009) used quite similar approach, 
and they had to build their own point rewarding system, since also cup-style competitions 
were included to index. Their indexes undoubtedly include all relevant sporting success for 
each club, but it’s questionable of what value should be given for each competition. In 
empirical part of this study I will simply measure sporting success of each domestic league 
and accept the fact that not all sporting success of each club is included in the model. Most 
of the clubs’ primary objective is to succeed in domestic league and only few of the largest 
clubs might value UEFA’s competitions as high or even higher than domestic league, but 
for smaller clubs the most important objective usually is to avoid relegation. Thus, it’s 
more common than not, that clubs do their most important sporting and business decisions 
considering their primary objectives in domestic league. 
 
There have been few proposals in previous literature that there shouldn’t be relationship 
between clubs’ profitability and sporting success. It has been suggested that clubs have 
particular level of profit or loss, and when it’s achieved clubs seek to maximize sporting 
success (e.g. Morrow, 1999; Gerrard & Dobson, 2000). Samagaio, et al. (2009) studied the 
relation between sporting, financial and stock market performance in English football 
clubs over the period 1995-2007. Their findings support previous literature that most of the 
clubs seek to achieve a minimum level of profit and after that their effort goes to 
maximizing sporting success. 
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Barajas, et al. (2005) found that their sports performance index explained only 14 percent 
of the net profit of Spanish football clubs, but at the same time the index explained 55 
percent of the expected income. Kuper & Szymanski (2014) studied the relationship 
between P/L before tax and league positions in English Premier League from 1993 to 
2013, but they couldn’t find clear connection between the two. They found that when 
club’s league position changed from previous season, in only 55 percent of the cases the 
club’s profit changed for same direction. If there would be no correlation at all, the figure 
would of course be exactly 50 percent. Hence, the correlation seems to be quite low. In the 
study of A.T. Kearney (2010) the correlation couldn’t be found between clubs’ sporting 
and economic performance in European top-five leagues. In the study the sporting 
performance was measured by UEFA’s yearly country scores and combination of different 
financial ratios were used to measure the economic performance. Interestingly, Gerrard 
(2005) estimated that in English football when clubs improve their total points by 1 
percent, it has negative effect of 0.25 percent in operating profit. Hence, also negative 
connections have been found between sporting success and profitability. 
 
To conclude this chapter, it seems that previous literature has quite generally accepted the 
positive correlation between sporting success and revenues. Still, there’s not much 
evidence of how this relation differs between leagues. Slightly contradictory results have 
been reported about the correlation between sporting success and profitability, although 
none of the studies have yet found strong positive or negative link between the two. 
There’s also numerous different ways to measure sporting and financial performance in 
previous literature. 
 
2.5 Operational environment 
 
European football clubs operate in somewhat different environment than ordinary 
companies. It could be argued that the difference is borne mostly because of various 
wishes of football clubs’ stakeholders. As already pointed out the club owners might have 
highly different objectives that owners of companies in other industries have. Players and 
managers of football clubs aren’t either normal employees, and they also have various 
wishes and even some power to influence the actions of club. Then fans are a stakeholder 
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group that many other industries don’t have, at least to the length that it exists for sport 
clubs, and their wishes should also be taken into account. 
 
The importance of previous mentioned stakeholders has already been partly discussed, so 
in this chapter the focus will be on league organisations and competition holders. Their 
status as a regulative operator, plays a key role by setting limits for football clubs’ 
operations. In this context the most important operators are each league organisation of the 
top-five leagues and UEFA. Their importance and affect for clubs’ operations will be 
discussed mainly from three different aspects. First, I will go through the concept of 
competitive balance and why it is or isn’t important for all of the leagues and clubs. After 
that the importance of UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Regulations will be discussed, and 
finally few of the most important league specific regulations will be brought up. 
 
2.5.1 Competitive balance 
 
One major difference between sports markets and “ordinary” markets is the relationship 
between competitors. In ordinary markets, companies are aggressively fighting to become 
market leaders and they don’t have to worry what happens to their competitors. In sports 
markets the situation is quite different. At the same time competition is very rough on the 
field between players and managers, but in the end, each club is also dependent on its 
competitors. Two teams together constitute the product of sports game. Thus, none single 
club can run the business without its competitors. 
 
Competitive balance measures the degree of outcome’s uncertainty in sports. It’s important 
topic for league organisations and competition holders because it influences spectators and 
popularity of the competition. Hence, it’s significant topic also for clubs itself. Competitive 
balance is at its maximum when two teams facing each other are equally good and both 
teams have same probability of winning the game with slight advantage for the team that’s 
playing on their own stadium. On the contrary, maximum competitive imbalance is 
reached, when the exact outcome of the game can be predicted by probability of one 
(Szymanski, 2001). 
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Actually, competitive balance could be even easier to understand in the time frame of one 
season. Competitive balance reaches its maximum when before the season starts, all teams 
that are playing in the competition have same probability of lifting the trophy at the end of 
the season. In most of European football leagues, where 20 teams are playing, this would 
mean that every team has 5% chance of winning the championship. When going through 
the archives of results from which ever sport or league, it’s quite easy to figure out that the 
maximum competitive balance, as well as maximum imbalance, is possible only in theory. 
This leads to question: what degree of competitive balance would be optimum? 
 
Unfortunately, it seems that although competitive balance has been a subject of numerous 
studies, in academic research there’s no consensus of the optimum degree for competitive 
balance. Numerous comparisons have been made between the sports and leagues, and 
American major leagues have been found more competitively balanced in comparison to 
European football leagues thanks to their different balancing mechanisms, e.g. player 
drafts, revenue sharing, salary caps etc. (e.g. Szymanski & Smith, 2002). It has been also 
proposed that these mechanisms would be taken into consideration in European football as 
well. The problem seems to be that these mechanisms only work well on closed leagues, 
and European club football isn’t willing to sacrifice the openness of leagues, as they want 
to guarantee the possibility to success for all of the clubs. Hence, American way leads to 
more competitively balanced league by sacrificing the opportunity for smaller teams to 
succeed and get promoted to the league. 
 
Competitive balance has been measured by numerous indicators, but one of the most used 
is the dispersion of winning percentage (Humphreys, 2002). Just to mention few other 
measures, also relative entropy (e.g. Horowitz, 1997), Gini coefficient (e.g. Schmidt & 
Berri, 2001) and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (e.g. Owen, et al., 2007) are used to measure 
competitive balance. Openness of the league complicates the measuring of competitive 
balance, and especially comparisons between open and closed leagues should be carefully 
conducted. Even further, if different sports are compared with each other, one should also 
take into account the different characters of the sports. The time frame chosen for 
calculations also greatly affects the results. Hence, the measuring should be done for 
different time periods, and actually Cairns, et al., (1986) separated long-term, medium-
term and short-term competitive balances. In the long-term, league tables are used to seek 
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for dominating clubs over the years. In medium-term, the measuring is done by number of 
games with prevailing uncertainty of the outcome in one season, and in short-term the 
focus is on outcome of individual game. In addition to choosing the length of the time 
frame, it should also be kept in mind that European football leagues aren’t static, and 
actually in the latest years quite many changes have taken place in European football. 
Hence, the exact timing of measuring the competitive balance should be taken into account 
as well. For example, just few years ago Bloching & Pawlowksi (2013) found that from the 
top-five European football leagues, French Ligue 1 and German Bundesliga are most 
competitively balanced, and English Premier League most imbalanced. If the study would 
be conducted again and data would be used from the last five seasons, it would be very 
surprising if the results would still be the same, as competitive balance of English Premier 
League has benefitted greatly from quite equal sharing of remarkably grown broadcast 
right revenues. 
 
Traditionally it has been thought that the higher level of uncertainty for match outcome 
would be positively correlated with greater attendance, but latest studies haven’t actually 
found significant connection between the two (eg. Buraimo & Simmons, 2008; Kringstad, 
et al., 2018). Szymanski & Smith (2002) considered 22 articles about competitive balance, 
of which only 10 provided evidence that higher level of uncertainty for match outcome 
increases attendance. For example, Buraimo & Simmons (2008 & 2009) found that 
relationship between gate attendance and probability of home win is U-shaped in both 
English Premier League and Spanish La Liga. Pawlowski & Anders (2012) got very 
similar results in their study of short-term competitive balance in German Bundesliga. 
Hence, their findings show that fans of European football prefer attending games with 
good probability of home team scoring many goals or going to the game as a clear 
underdog. Instead tight games with high level of uncertainty for match outcome doesn’t 
seem to have increasing influence on attendance. In football, high level of uncertainty for 
match outcome is quite often associated with low expectations for goals scored in a match, 
and fans attending the game would prefer watching games that are less likely to finish with 
close score (Buraimo & Simmons, 2008), as they tend to enjoy seeing goals. The situation 
is of course very different in other sports, such as basketball or ice-hockey. Hence, this 
character of football even further questions the importance of competitive balance in 
European football. 
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Although, the higher degree of short-term competitive balance in European football might 
not have the same direct positive effect on attendance, as it has in other sports, competitive 
balance as a whole shouldn’t be forgotten even in European football. Most important is to 
understand the both sides of competitive balance, and league organisations have to think it 
thoroughly what level of competitive balance would be for the best of the league at each 
time, and what they can do to increase or decrease competitive balance. Smaller leagues in 
European field of football are often characterized by one dominating club (e.g. HJK in 
Finnish Veikkausliiga, Rosenborg BK in Norwegian Eliteserien, FC Copenhagen in 
Danish Superliga, FC Basel in Swiss Super League, Celtic FC in Scottish Premiership, 
etc.). The competitive balance of these leagues is weak, and the dominating club lifts 
trophies way too often. The good part for the whole league in this situation comes from the 
UEFA’s club competitions. If the club, which dominates domestic league year after year, 
qualifies for UEFA’s competition and even succeeds in the tournament, the whole 
domestic league benefits from the rising interest of the public. The situation is very similar 
with top-five leagues, and each league organisation should almost continuously make 
decisions whether to increase or decrease the competitive balance of the league. For 
example, Spanish La Liga has benefitted greatly from the popularity of two dominating 
clubs, FC Barcelona and Real Madrid CF. Hence, they have purposefully kept quite low 
level of competitive balance by letting clubs individually negotiate their own broadcast 
right contracts, which increases the competitive imbalance. On the other hand, competitive 
balance of English Premier League has increased in last years, thanks to remarkable 
growth of broadcast right revenues and more equal sharing mechanism. 
 
To conclude the importance of competitive balance for European club football, it should be 
understood that the concept isn’t as simple as it is in many other sports, especially in major 
American leagues. In Europe, especially UEFA’s competitions and openness of the leagues 
complicate the approach to the concept. There’s no optimum amount of competitive 
balance, and especially in the field of European football it’s important that each league 
organisation actively monitors and manages the competitive balance of their own league. 
Competitive balance is also important concept for the association between clubs’ financial 
performance and sporting success. Decisions made by league organisations to increase or 
decrease competitive balance have direct impact to the relation between financial 
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performance and sporting success. For example, more equal sharing of broadcast right 
revenue leads directly to lower connection between revenues and sporting success because 
badly performed teams get greater share of the broadcast right deals at the expense of well 
performed teams. Thus, the concept of competitive balance is highly important for each 
league organisation, and through their actions the competitive balance also influences 
leagues’ and clubs’ connections between financial performance and sporting success. 
 
2.5.2 UEFA Financial Fair Play Regulations 
 
Union of European Football Associations, or shortly UEFA, operates in the field of 
European football. UEFA is most well-known from organizing European cup tournaments, 
Champions League and Europa League. Alongside domestic leagues, these tournaments 
are often the most important ones for European football clubs, although only few of the 
best teams from domestic leagues qualify each year for these tournaments. Playing in 
either Champions League or Europa League guarantees a great increase for club’s 
revenues, so qualifying is highly desired for any club. These tournaments give UEFA a 
power over European football clubs and recently they have started to use this power more 
for the benefit of European football. 
 
UEFA requires that every team qualified for their tournaments has to provide audited 
financial statements and show that the club meets UEFA’s criteria. If the criteria are met, 
UEFA rewards the club with a license that allows them to play in the tournament. 
Financial Fair Play concept was approved in 2010 and its first requirements were added to 
criteria set in 2011. The main idea of the regulations is to protect viability and 
sustainability of European club football. Amongst other things regulations aim to protect 
clubs’ creditors and employees. Financial Fair Play concept also aims to encourage clubs 
to operate on the basis of their own generated revenues and to spend responsibly. (UEFA, 
2015) 
 
As of today, Financial Fair Play has two major requirements that were added to already 
existing criteria set for clubs, which have qualified for UEFA competitions. First 
requirement is that clubs can’t have overdue payables towards other clubs, their employees 
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or social/tax authorities. Thus, clubs have to give appropriate proof for UEFA that they 
don’t have any overdue payables. This requirement was first time active in 2011. The 
second requirement has been active since 2013, and it requires clubs to break even on the 
basis of their relevant income and expenses. Assessment period is three years and in that 
time frame clubs can report maximum losses of 5 million euros, which is defined as an 
“acceptable deviation” (Franck, 2015). However, clubs are still allowed to report higher 
losses up to certain limit if it’s directly covered by club’s owner or other related party. For 
first two assessment periods the limit was 45 million euros and after that it has been 30 
million euros. Regulations have detailed information which revenues and expenses are 
seen as relevant, but the main idea is that everything related to football is relevant and 
included to calculations, although investments in stadiums, training facilities, youth 
development and women’s football are excluded from the calculations. (UEFA, 2015) 
 
The UEFA’s Club Financial Control Body monitors that the regulations are met, and their 
prior goal is to secure objectives of the regulations. They’re working to identify and defeat 
possible attempts to bend the rules and their objectives. Still, clubs aren’t automatically 
excluded from the tournament, if it’s found that they aren’t following the regulations. 
UEFA has bunch of other disciplinary actions as of warning, reprimand, fine, deduction of 
points, withholding of revenues from UEFA competition, etc., that are considered first. 
The heaviest action would be withdrawal of a title or award. Although the list of sanctions 
is long, UEFA sometimes might choose more rehabilitative approach instead of punishing 
clubs, which has led to conclusion of settlement agreements between a club and UEFA’s 
Club Financial Control Body. This actually is in line with the objective to protect European 
club football instead of making punishing itself an objective. (UEFA, 2015) 
 
Financial Fair Play Regulations and especially the break-even requirement has been 
subject of different studies since announcing and it has already received quite much 
critique. D’Andrea & Masciandro (2016) have greatly summed up few of the most 
important critiques that have been presented towards these regulations. To be fair, most of 
the critique has been written before or just after the break-even requirement went active. 
Now that the regulations have been active for few years, we can start to see the effects that 
they are having in European club football. 
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Madden (2014) argues that the regulations limit the amounts of external capital that could 
be used for football and this way regulations lead to Pareto inefficiencies. In this context 
the Pareto inefficiency implicates that without these restrictions and by giving all the 
power back to the markets, it would lead to higher amounts of money moving around in 
European club football (to see more about Pareto efficiency, see e.g. Censor, 1977). 
Undoubtedly break-even requirement limits the money that are poured to football from 
rich owners, as it is its purpose. However, there are still ways that owners can fund their 
clubs by investing on stadiums, youth development etc. However, whether regulations lead 
to Pareto inefficiencies, it depends on what is the indicator that one is trying to maximize. 
If the indicator is money moving around in European football, regulations probably lead to 
Pareto inefficiencies. But more importantly one could easily argue that this isn’t the case 
when the indicator is clubs’ revenue or profit. Actually, regulations seem to work quite 
well for these indicators as clubs are required to work on their own generated revenues and 
losses are limited. 
 
Madden (2014) also argues that regulations shift money from players to owners and that 
this decrease in players wages would reduce the overall quality of the European leagues. 
As of today, one could argue that there’s no evidence of players’ wages to be reduced 
because of the regulations. Results are actually quite opposite as clubs’ revenues and also 
players’ wages are continuously growing. Even though wages would be slightly reduced, 
it’s hard to see that it would directly reduce the quality of European leagues. Talented 
youngsters would probably still try to reach the top level, even though wages of top players 
would be cut by half. Hence, it seems that only real threat for quality of European football 
is other leagues in different continents as they can continue to pay high wages for talented 
players. UEFA must have thought that European football is far above of other continents in 
terms of popularity, so they don’t see it as a threat that talented players would all leave to 
other continents to get higher wages. Some movement have been seen, especially towards 
China and United States, but the greatest talents are at the moment still playing in Europe. 
 
Peeters and Szymanski (2014) on the other hand argue that Financial Fair Play Regulations 
are similar to US salary caps, but worse articulated. Regulations limit competition in 
transfer markets and players’ wages are pushed downwards without achieving benefits 
from increased competitiveness. Their conclusion is that break-even requirement can’t 
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increase competitiveness and that it becomes harder for small teams to challenge top clubs, 
which actually decreases competitive balance. They would prefer US style salary caps also 
in European football. Now that regulations have been active for few years, one could make 
opposing argument that actually in the last few transfer windows there haven’t been sign of 
limited competition in the player markets. Power that players have over clubs are greater 
than ever and many of them are demanding that their clubs are playing and even 
succeeding in the Champions League. As already pointed out there aren’t yet any evidence 
of reduced wages, although it can be expected that wage to revenue –ratio won’t keep 
growing as a consequence of break-even requirement. 
 
Franck (2014) argues greatly that if regulations work well, they would restore incentives 
for good management and increase pressure to produce higher revenues, which could even 
lead to higher wages. This actually seems to be happening right now. Hamil, et al. (2004) 
have argued that there indeed exists lot of possibilities to improve clubs’ practices in 
corporate governance, such as financial planning or risk assessment. Regulations are also 
creating pressure for the clubs to seek for competitive advance in these areas as well. 
 
Franck (2014) claims that Financial Fair Play Regulations shouldn’t even be compared to 
US style salary caps. Salary caps are not suitable for European football because of open 
league systems and qualifications for UEFA tournaments don’t allow such inflexible rules. 
He also argues that European club football is characterized with “multi-level filtering” 
between different countries and that it needs certain level of competitive imbalance to 
work well. Another important factor to be considered is that salary caps don’t put same 
kind of pressure on clubs to generate greater revenues as break-even requirement does. 
Thus, salary caps could actually lead to Pareto inefficiencies in revenues. Limiting salaries 
of course could work as an incentive for club owners to strive for higher revenues, as they 
could directly benefit from it in terms of higher profits and possibly dividends, but as seen 
before, owners of football clubs act usually very differently than owners of companies in 
other industries. Also, salary caps seem to be often quite high and clubs could still report 
losses although salaries are limited. Usually club owners have also other interests than only 
maximizing their profits from the operations of football club, which is easy to understand, 
because world is full of more profitable industries. Club owners’ first objective seems 
often to be sporting success, which leads to greater market share and coverage, which in 
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turn could be used for instance for the benefit of club owners’ other businesses. But if we 
still expect that salary caps would lead to shift money from players to owners, this would 
also lead to situation, where European club football would be even more vulnerable as 
talented footballers could be persuaded to other continents. To conclude comparison 
between US salary caps and break-even requirement, the latter gives more power to the 
markets while the first one leads to more equal competition by sacrificing possibly greater 
revenues. 
 
Sass (2012) and Vöpel (2013) are both worried that Financial Fair Play Regulations would 
freeze existing hierarchy between teams in European football. This is probably the most 
feared consequence that the regulations could result and naturally regulations are mostly 
criticized about it. Model build by Sass (2012) predicts that big clubs will continue 
growing and small clubs will become smaller and smaller over time. In the long-run this 
would lead to maximally uneven competitive balance and complete dominance of big 
clubs. Vöpel (2013) makes similar conclusions that regulations are intrinsically anti-
competitive, and that second instrument would be necessary in order to restore previous 
competitive balance. That instrument could be some kind of revenue sharing between 
clubs. Franck (2014) makes opposing argument that before regulations went active, it was 
actually more usual that biggest clubs benefitted from rich benefactors, not vice versa. 
There were much less that kind of cases where rich benefactors started to fund small clubs, 
which eventually grew to one of the big ones and this way increased competitive balance. 
 
As stated earlier, competitive balance is a controversial topic and there’s no right amount 
of competitiveness that every league should have. Results from various studies don’t even 
agree that more competitively balanced leagues would lead to higher public interest and 
revenues. Hence, this probably isn’t the best indicator to be used when reviewing Financial 
Fair Play Regulations. It seems that there still isn’t strong evidence that regulations will 
lead to decreased competitive balance. Few opposing arguments could be presented. 
Firstly, it shouldn’t be stated as a fact that biggest teams today will continue to generate 
greatest revenues in the future and this way dominate the leagues. Revenues from 
broadcast rights are already distributed more evenly in top-five leagues. Regulations just 
demand clubs to pay more attention and to develop their businesses. As of today, there are 
so great amounts of money floating around in football activities that this request is indeed 
  
 43 
necessary. Secondly and even more importantly, people often tend to forget that UEFA 
isn’t the only operator that’s acting on the field of European football and that their sphere 
of influence is actually quite limited. Financial Fair Play Regulations don’t affect teams 
that aren’t qualified for Champions League or Europa League. Thus, rich benefactors can 
still start to fund small clubs with big money and even make huge losses on the way to the 
top. They just need to concentrate also on building the business around the team so that 
revenues will go up and at someday revenues will cover the costs and the team is allowed 
to play in UEFA’s tournaments. 
 
A great example provided by Terrien, et al. (2017) is AS Monaco’s journey from French 
Ligue 2 to Champions League in just couple of seasons. On season 2012/2013 they 
managed to win Ligue 2 and were promoted to Ligue 1. During the next season, AS 
Monaco was quite clearly maximizing sporting success under quite soft budget constraint. 
Thus, they were willing to risk a lot of money to achieve sporting success already in the 
first season after their promotion to the highest league in France. High risks paid off as 
they reached the second place with nine points behind the league winners Paris Saint 
German. During the three-year assessment period, they also managed to follow Financial 
Fair Play Regulations, and the club was rewarded with entry to the Champions League. 
Since that, the degree of competitive balance in French Ligue 1 has increased as there’s 
now one more team fighting for places in UEFA’s tournaments. In the season 2016/2017 
AS Monaco even ended the winning streak of PSG in Ligue 1 by lifting the trophy after 
four consequent wins of PSG. 
 
There’s also some other interesting empirical evidence that the fears of freezing existing 
hierarchy or creating less competition (e.g. Sass, 2012), doesn’t seem that immediate or 
even threatening. Since the regulations have been introduced, world of European football 
has actually already seen new club coming into the fight of top positions like it has been 
the case with Manchester City, Paris Saint German or Chelsea, with billionaire owners 
putting in their money. RB Leipzig was founded in 2009, when they started from the fifth 
highest league stage in German football. The club is owned by wealthy owner Red Bull, 
and the company has heavily sponsored the operations of the club. Just seven seasons after 
founding, the club was promoted to the highest level of German football, Bundesliga. On 
the first season in the highest level, the club already reached second place, which meant 
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qualifying for the Champions League next season, as they also had managed to follow the 
Financial Fair Play Regulations. Undoubtedly Bundesliga benefits now from higher 
competitive balance thanks to RB Leipzig and their wealthy owners Red Bull. 
 
Even more importantly, just couple of seasons ago the footballing world saw the 
Cinderella story of Leicester City, as they were promoted to English Premier League for 
season 2014/2015 and on the next season they went on to lift the trophy before the likes of 
Manchester United, Arsenal or Liverpool. Leicester also did it by following the Financial 
Fair Play Regulations, and on the next season they even won their group in Champions 
League and proceeded all the way to the quarter finals. In the same season 2015/2016 the 
club benefitted so well from winning the league that their revenues increased by 23% and 
the club debuted in Money League top-20 listing, which ranks European clubs in terms of 
revenue (Deloitte, 2017b). Now it seems that they have cemented their place in the English 
Premier League and are fighting for the places in top-10. Undoubtedly English Premier 
League is now more competitively balanced, as Leicester has come into the league to 
reduce the gap between big-six clubs (Arsenal, Chelsea, Liverpool, Manchester City, 
Manchester United and Tottenham) and the rest. 
 
One could argue that these examples are just random individual events that just have 
occurred in the short period of time. Also, the rises of AS Monaco and RB Leipzig 
happened at the verge of Financial Fair Play Regulations, so it could be argued that they 
have benefitted from slightly eased restrictions. Still it doesn’t lessen the fact that these 
three European top leagues seem to have enjoyed of higher competitive balance since the 
introduction of Financial Fair Play Regulations. Only future will tell if the regulations 
really have negative effect on competitive balance or not. 
 
2.5.3 League specific regulations 
 
In addition to UEFA Financial Fair Play Regulations, each league organisation in the field 
of European football can of course define their own rules and regulations, which clubs 
need to follow if they wish to participate in the competition. Regulations have existed 
already before UEFA’s regulations, but even more importantly league organisations seem 
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to react on UEFA’s concerns and they are starting to introduce their own regulations as 
well. As already discussed, Financial Fair Play Regulations only affect clubs that achieve a 
place in UEFA’s tournaments. Hence, each league organisation can individually evaluate if 
they want to introduce similar regulations to other clubs as well. In this subchapter I will 
go through few of the most important regulations that top-five European football leagues 
have and how they differ, especially in regard to clubs’ financials. 
 
Traditionally, French Ligue 1 and German Bundesliga have had most strict financial rules 
of the top-five leagues. The French Football Federation introduced the first financial 
regulation system in European club football in 1990 to prevent French clubs from making 
persistent losses (Dermit-Richard, et al., 2017). In France, the financial governing body 
DNCG (Direction National du Contrôle de Gestion) actively monitors that the clubs follow 
the rules that they are bounded to follow. Clubs are required to publish their audited 
financial accounts, and DNCG can place sanctions if specific financial standards aren’t met 
(Jardin, 2009). The focus of the DNCG’s financial regulations is to ensure clubs’ solvency. 
In comparison to UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Regulations, DNCG actually allows clubs to 
make remarkable losses as long as they’re covered by club owners’ money, whereas UEFA 
requires clubs to operate in terms of their own generated revenues (Dermit-Richard, et al., 
2017). 
 
Clubs participating in German Bundesliga are required to provide audited financial 
statements and to prove their economic capacities in every six months; 1) before the season 
and 2) during the season. In addition, clubs need to submit detailed information of their 
transfer activities and prove that they don’t have overdue payables towards other clubs, 
their own employees or social/tax authorities. If these requirements aren’t met before the 
season starts, DFL (Deutsche Fußball Liga) doesn’t grant the club with the license that 
entitles the club to participate in UEFA’s club competitions. If violations of the obligations 
occur during the season, DFL uses contractual penalties to punish the club. (DFL, 2017) 
Hence, it could be argued that the financial regulations of DFL also focus on ensuring 
clubs’ solvency without paying too much attention on clubs’ profitability, although 
Bundesliga clubs have traditionally reported quite good profits, and they’re also bound by 
previously discussed 50+1 rule, which at least partly limits the possibilities of billionaire 
owners to cover persistent losses. 
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Recently English Premier League has also started to increasingly regulate financials of 
participating clubs. Clubs are required to provide their audited financial statements each 
year by 1 March. If the board of the Premier League or any person appointed by the board 
has reasonable suspects of a club breaching the rules, it is allowed to inspect financial 
records of any club. Clubs participating in English Premier League are required to prove 
yearly that they don’t have any overdue payables towards other clubs, their employees or 
social/tax authorities. Club are also required to provide future financial information each 
year by 31 March in forms of projected profit and loss accounts, cash flow, balance sheet 
and relevant explanatory notes at maximum of quarterly intervals. Corresponding 
submission dates each year for three promoted clubs are 30 June for audited financial 
statements and 1 July for future financial information. If it’s found from the last two 
financial statements that the aggregation of club’s earnings before tax results in a loss, the 
board will require certain calculations to prove club’s solvency. If the loss further exceeds 
certain limits, the board can also initiate punitive actions. (Premier League, 2017a) 
 
In addition to requiring the financial reports and observing clubs’ solvency, English 
Premier League has also started to control clubs’ constantly growing wages. They’ve 
introduced Short Term Cost Control Rules, which are limiting the yearly growth of 
personnel expenses to maximum of £7 million. Clubs’ first reports regarding Short Term 
Cost Control were only due March 2018. (Premier League, 2017a) Hence, there’s no 
empirical evidence of the rule in action, and some relief to the rule is provided at the 
beginning. In the long-term it’s interesting to see how this rule effects the operations of 
English clubs, and if their profitability will get better. 
 
Clubs participating in Spanish La Liga are affected by the Sports Law 10/1990, which 
states that professional football clubs have to become Public Limited Sport Companies 
(Sociedad Anónima Deportiva or shortly SAD), although four clubs (Athletic Bilbao, FC 
Barcelona, CA Osasuna and Real Madrid CF) could continue their operations as clubs, 
since they could show positive balances on the audit period (Llopis-Goig, 2014). Still both, 
the legal entities and four exception clubs are all bound to follow specific regulations 
(Ascari & Gagnepain, 2006). Until the year 2013, clubs participating in Spanish La Liga 
were actually very slightly regulated. However, there existed already some regulations 
  
 47 
about shareholders, accounting procedures and dividend payments (Ascari & Gagnepain, 
2006). In 2013, LFP (Liga de Futbol Profesional) reacted to UEFA’s Financial Fair Play 
Regulations and introduced quite similar rules for Spanish football, which have been active 
since the start of the season 2013/14. Clubs participating in Spanish La Liga are now also 
required to yearly submit their accounts to LFP for approval. Aim of the regulations is to 
ensure that Spanish clubs live within their means. Thus, budgets and clubs’ spending are 
capped specifically for each club in accordance with their income levels. This way the 
league doesn’t permit a club to sign new players, if they think that the club can’t afford it. 
(Corrigan; ESPN, 2013) 
 
Italian Serie A has traditionally had quite loose financial rules, and as a result many of the 
Italian clubs have experienced financial difficulties. However, national licensing system 
has been effective in Italy since 2009 requiring clubs to follow particular rules in 
accordance to legal, economic, infrastructural, sporting and organizational requirements. 
Lately also FIGC (Federazione Italiana Giuco Calcio) has started to monitor Italian clubs’ 
financials more closely. Implementation of new rules started in season 2015/16 and the 
rules will be in full power at the beginning of season 2018/19. The requirements are quite 
similar as UEFA’s regulations and Italian clubs are already required to prove that they 
don’t have any overdue payables. The break-even rule will be implemented for season 
2018/19. In addition, FIGC has introduced three financial indicators and strict limits that 
clubs need to follow if they want to avoid sanctions. The indicators are: 1) current assets / 
current liabilities, 2) debts / revenues and 3) (wages + amortization of players registration) 
/ turnover. The limits will tighten from season 2015/16 to 2018/19, and at the end of the 
implementation period corresponding limits are 0.6, 1.5 and 0.8, respectively. (Uva, 2016) 
Hence, it seems that Italian Serie A is the latest of the top-five leagues to react on the 
financial difficulties of football clubs, but at the same time they are introducing very 
extensive set of financial regulations in comparison to other leagues. 
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3 Hypotheses 
3.1 Forming the hypotheses 
 
Following hypotheses are based on previously presented literature, theories and findings of 
various studies. On top of that I used my own analytical thinking and reasoning. The model 
will be made to explain clubs’ revenues and operating profits, which in my opinion are two 
of the most important financial metrics of football clubs, and especially operating profits 
have been too overlooked in previous literature. Model is based on few variables, which 
are expected to have or not to have an effect on either revenues or operating profit. Small 
variations to model will be made to seek for differences and to study the impacts of various 
variables. 
 
The sporting success could be measured by numerous different metrics, such as points 
obtained, winning percentage or average goal difference. The success could be also 
measured for various competitions, such as domestic league, domestic cups and UEFA’s 
club competitions (e.g. Barajas, et al., 2005). Measuring sporting success in various 
competitions at the same time would lead to difficult decision on how to value success in 
each competition. Hence, in this study the measurement will be kept simple and 
straightforward, as there aren’t too many studies on this topic anyway. I will use simply 
domestic league positions of each season to measure sporting success and accept the fact 
that not all sporting success of each club is included in the model. Most of the clubs’ 
primary objective is to succeed in domestic league and only few of the largest clubs might 
value UEFA’s competitions as high or even higher than domestic league, but for smaller 
clubs the most important objective usually is to avoid relegation. Thus, it’s more common 
than not, that clubs do their most important sporting and business decisions considering 
their primary objectives in domestic league. 
 
Hypotheses are built around league position’s effect on revenues and operating profit. In 
addition, few sensitivity tests are conducted to see outcomes of different variations to the 
model. First variation is whether league position in previous season has different effect 
than positioning in current season. Then model is driven separately for each of the top-five 
leagues to seek for differences. Finally, the model is divided to time before UEFA 
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Financial Fair Play Regulations and time after the regulations were introduced to catch the 
possible effects that the regulations have had. 
 
3.2 Influence of league position on revenues and operating P/L 
 
The first hypothesis is mainly built to test the data and to see whether it is consistent with 
previous studies. The connection between higher league position and greater revenues have 
been found before (e.g. Szymanski & Kuypers, 1999; Barajas, et al., 2005), and in 
academic research it has been quite generally accepted that sporting success and revenues 
are positively correlating with each other. Although some opposite empirical evidence has 
also been found (e.g. Haas, et al., 2004), but I would still assume that the positive 
connection between league positions and revenues can be found also from this data set. 
Hence, I test the following hypothesis: 
 
H1a: Ceteris paribus, winning the league is associated with higher revenues 
H1b: Ceteris paribus, league position is positively associated with revenues 
 
The previous literature has mostly failed to find the clear connection between clubs’ 
sporting success and profitability (e.g. Barajas, et al., 2005; A.T. Kearney, 2010; Kuper & 
Szymanski, 2014). However, there’s only limited empirical evidence from latest years, 
when for instance, UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Regulations have been active. Hence, it’s 
difficult to make precise predictions of the connection, and that’s why the second 
hypothesis is stated in null form:  
 
H2a: Ceteris paribus, winning the league is not associated with operating profit 
H2b: Ceteris paribus, league position is not associated with operating profit 
 
3.2.1 Current season versus previous season 
 
In previous hypotheses, league positions are used from the same year as clubs’ financial 
statements. For majority of the clubs, the fiscal year ends in May, June or July, and for all 
of the five big leagues, the football season ends in May. Thus, clubs’ fiscal year ends 
  
 50 
approximately at the same time as their season. Still there exist few clubs, whose fiscal 
year ends in December, but it’s assumed that these exceptions don’t have notable effect on 
the empirical results of this study. 
 
In this section, I want to study whether the influencing effect differs when using league 
positions from the same season as fiscal year compared to using league positions from the 
previous season. There are few factors for which it could be assumed that the connection 
between league position and revenues would be slightly stronger when using league 
positions from the previous season. The most important factor behind this assumption is 
the revenues obtained from UEFA’s club competitions. Clubs are allowed to participate in 
the competitions if they rank high enough in the previous season in their domestic league. 
As qualifying for these competitions directly increases clubs’ income in terms of 
broadcasting and matchday revenues, it also indirectly rewards clubs with numerous 
possibilities through greater coverage and popularity. Hence, the increases in income will 
actually be realized only next season when the club achieved sporting success in domestic 
league. This should be visible in the empirical results of this study as the economic 
importance of UEFA’s competitions is so huge for the clubs. 
 
Although it could be assumed that the connection would get stronger with revenue when 
using league positions from previous season, it’s hard to make same assumption on 
operating profit. European football clubs often tend to maximize sporting success instead 
of profits (e.g. Fort, 2000; Garcia-del-Barro & Szymanski, 2006; Dejonghe & Van Opstal, 
2010; Terrien, et al., 2017). Hence, if the club succeeds so well in their domestic league 
that they qualify for either of UEFA’s competitions, it’s likely that they already include 
this extra income to their budgets and start to make big investments on the team during 
summer in hopes of achieving sporting success also in the European fields. Thus, 
qualifying for UEFA’s competitions leads to remarkable increase for revenues next season, 
but it’s unclear and team-specific whether this increase is used to improve the sporting 
abilities of the team already in the same season. Hence, no assumptions can be made how 
this alteration to the model affects the connection between sporting success and operating 
profit. 
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3.2.2  Differences between leagues 
 
This part of the study is highly interesting, since it’s hard to make assumptions of how the 
connections differ between countries. There really aren’t many previous studies of this 
topic, where I could rely with my hypotheses. That’s the reason why this part will be 
studied without making any specific hypotheses and hopefully models can generate 
interesting results, that could be further analysed. Of course, league systems are somewhat 
different, and some assumptions could be made of how these differences in leagues would 
impact the results. For instance, the previously discussed differences between leagues in 
terms of broadcast right revenue distributing suggest that the link between sporting success 
and revenues could be strongest in Spanish La Liga and weakest in English Premier 
League. On the other hand, French Ligue 1 and German Bundesliga have traditionally been 
mostly financially regulated of the top-five leagues, which could signal that the connection 
between sporting success and operating profit would be highest for clubs participating in 
these two leagues. 
 
Still in reality, league systems have actually experienced many changes also in the timeline 
of the data, between years 2008 and 2016. Especially distributions of the broadcast right 
revenues have changed in many leagues (e.g. Deloitte, 2017a). As discussed earlier, many 
leagues have also started to pay more attention on regulation of the clubs’ financials, which 
makes it even harder to make even educated guesses of the differences between leagues in 
this manner. Thus, this part of the study will focus on identifying the differences between 
leagues, but further investigation would be required to deeply understand the reasons 
behind the found differences. 
 
3.2.3 Pre- and post-UEFA Financial Fair Play 
 
UEFA Financial Fair Play Regulations were created to encourage clubs to practice 
business in terms of their own generated revenues. Hence, clubs are required to break even 
in the time frame of three consecutive seasons. (UEFA, 2015) Regulations were introduced 
2011 at the beginning of seasons. Hence, I will study whether connection between clubs’ 
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financial performance and sporting success differs between time periods 2008-2011 and 
2012-2016 by running the models separately for both time periods. 
 
Although regulations weren’t solely done to increase the connection between sporting 
success and financial performance, some elements from the regulations could mean that 
the connection would get higher. Especially the break-even requirement should mean that 
clubs’ operating profits will get higher in the long run. Hence, it’s highly interesting to see 
whether the regulations have led to greater connection between clubs’ sporting success and 
profitability. This part of the study will also be studied without making any specific 
hypotheses of the possible differences and emphasis will be on identifying the differences, 
although some further analysis will also be conducted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 53 
4 Data and methodology 
4.1 Data 
 
The data used in this study consist of clubs from Europe’s top-five football leagues; 
English Premier League, French Ligue 1, German Bundesliga, Italian Serie A and Spanish 
La Liga. Data is gathered from the years 2008-2016. There are 98 teams playing each year 
in Europe’s top-five leagues, and when the time period is nine years, this would mean 882 
data points in total. Unfortunately, financial data wasn’t available for all of the teams and 
years, but I still managed to gather 690 data points, which should be enough to represent 
the group. 
 
The financial data of this study is gathered from the Orbis –database, which is produced 
and held by Bureau van Dijk. There are many different accounting indicators that could be 
used to measure the financial performance of professional football clubs (Plumley, et al., 
2014), but the most important indicators are probably revenue and operating profit, which 
will be used in this study. All the financials are in US dollars and they are primarily 
obtained from the club level to exclude irrelevant revenues and expenses that have nothing 
to do with football club’s operations. However, financial data of some clubs are gathered 
from the holding company level as there were important revenues or expenses missing 
from the club level. This is particularly the case with few biggest clubs, where club level 
financials didn’t include revenues and expenses from stadium or something as important as 
that. Domestic league positions have been gathered from archives of each league’s 
website. In German Bundesliga, the league positions vary between 1 and 18, and for other 
leagues the scale is from 1 to 20. 
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
As stated earlier the whole data used in this study consist of 690 data points, although 
different models are built the way that not all of them uses the whole data set. Different 
variables that are used and the basic statistics for the whole 690 data points are presented 
in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Definition Obs. Min. Max. Mean Std. dev. 
REVENUE Revenue ($’000) 690 8972 749804 136631 136611 
EBIT Operating P/L ($’000) 690 -321695 116857 -8723 35173 
LEAGUE POSITION Club’s position in domestic league 690 1 20 10,37 5,66 
WINNER 1 = if club won the league, otherwise 0 690 0 1 0,05 0,21 
SPA 1 = if club plays in La Liga, otherwise 0 690 0 1 0,20 0,40 
GER 1 = if club plays in Bundesliga, otherwise 0 690 0 1 0,09 0,29 
ITA 1 = if club plays in Serie A, otherwise 0 690 0 1 0,22 0,42 
FRA 1 = if club plays in Ligue 1, otherwise 0 690 0 1 0,22 0,42 
 
In addition to variables presented in the table, in different models I will also use previous 
year’s REVENUE, EBIT, LEAGUE POSITION and WINNER variables. These variables 
are used especially when comparing effects of sporting success in current and previous 
season. One can also see from the table that there’s no dummy variable for English 
Premier League. One of the top-five leagues had to be left out from the variables to avoid 
dummy variable trap situation. As a result, English Premier League is now actually used as 
a benchmark league in the models. 
 
The data consist of 139 different football clubs, so on average this means five fiscal years 
per club. For many of the club’s maximum of nine fiscal years were gathered, but for some 
club’s data could be gathered for only one year. It could be the case that club had played 
only one year on the highest level, but also unavailability of the data is part of the reason. 
There are also quite many clubs for which financial data wasn’t available at all. Average 
league position of the data set is 10,37. If all the data points of 882 could’ve been gathered 
the average league position would’ve been 10,32. Thus, the data is quite evenly distributed 
between different league positions. The data set includes 33 winner clubs out of 45. Hence, 
in this study “winner clubs” represent 4,8% of the data, whereas this figure would’ve been 
5,1% if all the data would’ve been available. 
 
Largest revenue of nearly $750 million was produced by Manchester United in 2014. In 
the same fiscal year, Manchester United also generated operating profit of $117 million, 
which is more than any other club generated in the data set. On the other hand, smallest 
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revenue of $9 million was produced by AS Livorno Calcio in 2010. Manchester City is the 
club responsible for highest operating losses of $322 million in 2011. From 2008 to 2014 
Manchester City actually reported the total amount of $994 million in operating losses. 
Since that, the club has reported operating profits of $3 million in 2015 and $4 million in 
2016. 
 
Basic statistics of revenue and operating P/L are presented separately for each league in the 
Table 2. Other leagues are represented very well in the data set, but one should notice that 
German Bundesliga is represented by only 11 clubs and 63 observations because of 
unavailability of the data. The data set includes couple of largest Bundesliga teams (FC 
Bayern München and Borussia Dortmund), so mean statistics could be slightly upward 
biased. Let’s now see what can be read from the table without paying too much attention 
on German figures. 
 
In terms of revenue, English clubs have generated on average almost three times more than 
French clubs and two-times more than Spanish clubs. Surprisingly, Italian clubs have 
generated greater revenues than Spanish clubs, although this could be the case because of 
Spanish La Liga is financially dominated by only two clubs, FC Barcelona and Real 
Madrid CF, and the data set includes only four and five observations, respectively, out of 
maximum nine observations for both. Although English clubs have generated highest 
revenues, they have at the same time reported operating losses of $19 million on average. 
Also, Italian and French clubs have reported operating losses of more than $10 million on 
average. Positively, Spanish and German clubs have on average reported operating profits 
of $3 million and $7 million, respectively. 
 
The quite high standard deviation of revenues and operating P/L in each of the five leagues 
should also be emphasized, as it signals the financial imbalance, which often exists in 
European football leagues. For instance, in Spanish La Liga the standard deviation of 
revenues is approximately 1.4 times the average revenues reported by the clubs. As 
revenues can’t be negative, this is a clear signal of the fact that few clubs have 
substantially higher revenues than others. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics by league 
League Indicator ($’000) Obs. Clubs Min. Max. Mean Std. dev. 
ENG Revenue 178 35 63541 749804 210562 151518 
SPA Revenue 139 30 21100 707983 103053 148608 
GER Revenue 63 11 42133 722038 188477 169420 
ITA Revenue 155 30 8972 442459 121674 88117 
FRA Revenue 155 33 9563 629386 75724 74879 
ENG Operating P/L 178 35 -321695 116857 -19453 53535 
SPA Operating P/L 139 30 -104916 79212 3357 26949 
GER Operating P/L 63 11 -56140 85156 7239 24220 
ITA Operating P/L 155 30 -122547 46260 -10408 27366 
FRA Operating P/L 155 33 -61614 19648 -12036 14904 
 
4.3 Model 
 
Four multivariate linear regression models are built to study previously stated hypotheses. 
As a result, we will see how chosen explanatory variables will affect dependent variable, 
or if any influence can be proven through statistically significant connections. In Model 1 
the whole data set of 690 data points is used to study how club’s revenues are affected by 
its league position and whether the club won the league or not. The model will also study 
how persistent club’s revenue is through explanatory power of previous year’s revenue. 
Differences between leagues are studied through dummy variables for four leagues while 
English Premier League is used as a benchmark league. Model 2 is very similar with the 
first one, but instead of revenue, now I’ll study the effects that sporting success has on 
operating P/L or EBIT as it is typed in the model. All 690 data points are used also in this 
model. The first two models will especially seek answers for hypotheses H1 and H2. 
 
Few data points are dropped when moving to Models 3 & 4. There were 11 teams that 
didn’t play on highest domestic level in previous year when the financial data is gathered, 
so now 679 data points are used. Models are otherwise similar as previous ones, but now 
league positions and winner dummy variables are gathered from previous year (t-1). These 
models are especially used to see if club’s sporting success on previous season has 
different influence on clubs’ revenues or operating P/L as current season. 
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Differences between leagues are studied by running all the four models separately for each 
of the top-five leagues. This way connections can be clearly compared between countries 
and differences can be further analysed. There is a different amount of data points when 
running models for each league, and this is because of the fact that financial data were 
more available for some leagues than others. Still there are enough data points for each 
league so that models can be run and further analysed. Models for German Bundesliga 
have lowest data points of only 63. All other countries have more than 130 data points, 
English Premier League having the highest number of 178 data points out of maximum 
180. Thus, although data unavailability is somewhat restraining the study, it was nice to 
notice that only two data points were missing from theoretical maximum for English clubs. 
 
Influences of UEFA Financial Fair Play Regulations are also studied with the four models. 
Data is divided for two different time periods: time before and time after regulations. 
Regulations were introduced in the beginning of season 2011/12. Hence, time before will 
cover years 2008-2011 and time after 2012-2016. The influence is studied by running the 
models separately for these time periods. Models for year 2008-2011 have at least 291 data 
points and models after regulations were introduced have at least 388 data points. 
 
The four models are presented below: 
 
1. 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +
𝛽3 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽4 𝑆𝑃𝐴 + 𝛽5 𝐺𝐸𝑅 + 𝛽6 𝐼𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽7 𝐹𝑅𝐴 
 
2. 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽3 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑟 +
𝛽4 𝑆𝑃𝐴 + 𝛽5 𝐺𝐸𝑅 + 𝛽6 𝐼𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽7 𝐹𝑅𝐴 
 
3. 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 +
𝛽2 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽3 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽4 𝑆𝑃𝐴 +
𝛽5 𝐺𝐸𝑅 + 𝛽6 𝐼𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽7 𝐹𝑅𝐴 
 
4. 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 +
𝛽3 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽4 𝑆𝑃𝐴 + 𝛽5 𝐺𝐸𝑅 + 𝛽6 𝐼𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽7 𝐹𝑅𝐴 
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5 Results 
5.1 General results 
 
Results for each of the previously presented four models can be found below from the 
Table 3. When viewing results in general, one can first see that explanatory power of the 
models is quite high. Especially for the revenue Models 1 & 3, which have r-square of 
0.932 and 0.933, respectively. On the other hand, EBIT models 2 & 4 have r-square of 
0.486 and 0.517, respectively. In general, it seems that the models are successfully built, 
and they provide quite accurate picture of the relations. 
 
Second important thing to notice is that football clubs’ revenue seems to be very persistent. 
In Model 1, 89% and in Model 3, 94% of previous year’s revenue will be generated in 
current year without influence of other variables. Operational P/L seems also to be highly 
persistent as 67% in Model 2 and 70% in Model 4 of previous year’s figure will be 
gathered in current season without the influence of other variables. These all results are 
statistically significant as P-values are under the 0.01. 
 
With first quick look on the league dummies, one can already notice some important 
results. From Model 1, one can see that English Premier League clubs are generating 
remarkably higher revenues than other clubs in four other leagues. For instance, clubs 
participating in French Ligue 1 generate approximately $28.6 million smaller revenues 
than English Premier League clubs after controlling for other factors. From four dummy 
leagues, German Bundesliga clubs are generating highest revenues, but they still generate 
on average $13.1 million smaller revenues than clubs in English Premier League. Thus, on 
average English Premier League clubs are generating significantly greater revenues than 
clubs in any other of the top-five leagues. On the other hand, it’s very interesting to look 
on the league dummies in Model 4. Now one can see that although English clubs are 
generating highest revenues, at the same time they are reporting smallest operational 
profits or highest operational losses, as all four dummy leagues have remarkable positive 
impact on EBIT. Even French clubs report on average $5.8 million higher operational 
results than English clubs after controlling for other factors. Now stated differences 
between countries are all statistically significant with P-values less than 0.05. 
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Table 3. Main results 
 
(1) 
Revenue 
(2) 
EBIT 
(3) 
Revenue 
(4) 
EBIT 
REVENUE PREV YEAR 
0.890*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.939*** 
(0.000) 
 
EBIT PREV YEAR  
0.666*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.703*** 
(0.000) 
LEAGUE POSITION 
-1263*** 
(0.000) 
208 
(0.259) 
  
LEAGUE POSITION PREV YEAR   
-2415*** 
(0.000) 
-205 
(0.266) 
WINNER 
59183*** 
(0.000) 
13499*** 
(0.006) 
  
WINNER PREV YEAR   
17849** 
(0.019) 
6621 
(0.177) 
SPA 
-22099*** 
(0.000) 
8390*** 
(0.004) 
-8701* 
(0.050) 
11710*** 
(0.000) 
GER 
-13093** 
(0.014) 
7076* 
(0.064) 
3038 
(0.575) 
12372*** 
(0.001) 
ITA 
-21954*** 
(0.000) 
53 
(0.985) 
-9686** 
(0.021) 
6855** 
(0.015) 
FRA 
-28612*** 
(0.000) 
201 
(0.943) 
-10673** 
(0.018) 
5815** 
(0.038) 
Constant 
52481*** 
(0.000) 
-7137** 
(0.013) 
40218*** 
(0.000) 
-8785*** 
(0.002) 
R2 0.932 0.486 0.933 0.517 
# of obs. 690 690 679 679 
Table 3 reports results of each of the four multivariate linear regression models presented in the previous 
chapter. In Models 1 & 3 the dependent variable is revenue and in Models 2 & 4 dependent variable is EBIT. 
Models 1 & 2 use league position and winner variable from current season and Models 3 & 4 use league 
position and winner variable from previous season (t-1). P-values are presented in parenthesis to evaluate 
significance of the results, p<0.01 ***, p<0.05 **, p<0.1 *. 
 
5.2 Influence of league position on revenue and operating P/L 
 
Let’s now study the first hypothesis H1, which states that winning the league and higher 
league position are both in connection with higher revenues. By looking at the results of 
the Model 1, hypothesis seems to be correct with statistically significant results (p<0.01). 
League winners generate on average $59.2 million higher revenues than other clubs, which 
is substantial amount in comparison to data set’s average revenue of $136.6 million. 
Climbing league positions is also profitable, as reaching just one position higher rewards a 
club with $1.3 million higher revenues on average. Although the results are clear, and they 
offer precise picture of the relation, they don’t tell us about the cause and effect 
relationship. Thus, by reading results of the models, it still can’t be told whether clubs get 
rewarded by winning the league or reaching higher position or whether just bigger clubs in 
terms of revenue are more often winning the league and reaching higher positions. As 
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already stated in the theory part of the study, the connection is likely to be two-sided. 
Higher revenues lead to greater sporting success and greater sporting success leads to 
higher revenues, but the study doesn’t reveal exact cause and effect relations between the 
two. 
 
Second hypothesis H2 states that winning the league or reaching higher league position 
aren’t connected with substantially higher operating profit. Model 2 was mainly built to 
provide answer for this question and to give us first results of the relation. As expected, no 
significant relation between league position and operating profit was found. However, 
model surprisingly states with statistically significant results (p<0.01) that winning the 
league is associated with $13.5 million higher operational result on average. This seems to 
be something that no previous studies have found out before and $13.5 million is highly 
remarkable amount as the average operational loss of a club is $8.7 million in the data set. 
Hence, the first two models clearly state that winning the league is associated with higher 
revenues, and on average 22.8% of the extra revenues will be also left to increase club’s 
operational profit. 
 
5.3 Current season versus previous season 
 
Models 3 & 4 were built to study how relations change when league positions are used 
from previous season and compared to financials from current season. It was assumed that 
sporting success in previous season has even greater connection with revenues mostly 
because of revenue increases from qualifying for UEFA’s club competitions were realized 
only on the next season. Model 3 was built to especially seek answer for this question, and 
precise conclusions can be made when comparing obtained results with the results from 
Model 1. Previous season’s league position is almost two times as important for revenue 
increases than league position in current season. On average, reaching one position higher 
on current season leads to $2.4 million greater revenue on the next season, as the same 
figure for current season was $1.3 million. One surprising result also rose from the Model 
3, which is that increased revenues from winning the league are mostly recognised already 
on the current season. League winners get on average $59.2 million increase on revenues 
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in the winning year but winning the league results only to $17.8 million increase on next 
year’s revenues. 
 
It was also assumed that no significant connection would be found between greater 
sporting success on previous season and operating profit in current season. Model 4 gives 
us answer for this question and one can see that the model doesn’t provide statistically 
significant results. Thus, results are actually very much in line with expectations. To 
conclude how operational profit is affected by clubs’ performance on the field, it can be 
said that no significant connection could be found from the data set. Still one remarkable 
exception was found, which was that winning league leads to $13.5 million higher 
operational profit on the same season. 
 
5.4 Differences between leagues 
 
Table 4 compares top-five leagues in regard of how winning the league or reaching higher 
league positions are related to generating revenue. Let’s first make few notices of the 
results in general and then move to deeper analysis. First of all, explanatory power of the 
model is again very high as r-square for each league is between 0.866 and 0.974. Secondly, 
revenue seems to be again very persistent as already stated when analysing the results 
provided in Table 3. However, now one can also see differences in the persistency between 
leagues. Spanish and French clubs have most persistent revenues with more than 96.1% of 
the revenues generated previous year are also generated in current year without the effects 
of other variables. English and German clubs are not far behind with persistency figures of 
87.4% and 84.8%, respectively. It could be interesting to compare these results with 
competitive balances of each league on the same time period. I would expect that lower 
persistency of revenues in English Premier League and German Bundesliga signals that 
their competitive balance is slightly higher than it is in Spanish La Liga and French Ligue 
1. However, clubs participating in Italian Serie A are generating only 67.8% of previous 
year’s revenues and it’s hard to say whether this is related to significantly higher 
competitive balance or perhaps lower importance of matchday revenue (e.g. Nicoliello & 
Zampatti, 2016), which could result in greater alterations on revenues. 
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Results of how winning the league effects on revenues are on line with previous findings. 
There is clear evidence that winning the league is related with substantially higher 
revenues and now one can also compare this relation between top-five European football 
leagues. Surprisingly in German, Italian and French leagues results are very close to each 
other, as league winners in these leagues generate $75-78 million higher revenues than 
other clubs. In Spain and England, league winners generate $43 million and $36 million 
higher revenues than other clubs, respectively. Again, by these models it can’t be 
concluded that English clubs get least rewarded by winning the league. It could just be the 
case that English Premier League is financially more competitively balanced than other 
leagues in terms of revenue. 
 
Relation between league position and higher revenues seems to be strongest in Germany 
and Italy, where reaching one position higher means nearly $3 million increase in 
revenues. Statistically significant relation can also be found for English clubs, which get 
almost $2 million higher revenue by reaching one higher position on average. For Spain 
and France, the model can’t find any statistically significant relation between league 
position and revenue. 
 
Table 4. Revenue models by league 
 ENG SPA GER ITA FRA 
REVENUE PREV YEAR 
0.874*** 
(0.000) 
0.971*** 
(0.000) 
0.848*** 
(0.000) 
0.678*** 
(0.000) 
0.961*** 
(0.000) 
LEAGUE POSITION 
-1861** 
(0.030) 
-273 
(0.538) 
-2961** 
(0.042) 
-2832*** 
(0.000) 
-566 
(0.241) 
WINNER 
36200** 
(0.035) 
42949*** 
(0.002) 
75616*** 
(0.001) 
74876*** 
(0.000) 
78233*** 
(0.000) 
Constant 
62956*** 
(0.000) 
12816** 
(0.035) 
59456*** 
(0.004) 
71337*** 
(0.000) 
10875 
(0.141) 
R2 0.909 0.974 0.939 0.876 0.866 
# of obs. 178 139 63 155 155 
Table 4 reports results for revenue model, which is separately run for each of the five leagues. Multivariate 
linear regression model is same as previously presented Model 1 without dummy variables for leagues. 
Dependent variable is revenue. League position and winner variable are from current season. P-values are 
presented in parenthesis to evaluate significance of the results, p<0.01 ***, p<0.05 **, p<0.1 *. 
 
Relation between reaching higher league position and operational profit is even more 
interesting. Table 5 is otherwise similar as Table 4, but now dependent variable is EBIT 
and the model used is previously presented Model 2 without dummy variables for different 
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leagues. From the Table 5, one can see that explanatory power of the EBIT model doesn’t 
get as high as in the revenue model. There are also some differences in r-square between 
leagues, as it varies from 0.239 in Italy to 0.658 in Germany. 
 
Persistency of operational P/L was discussed earlier in the analysis of Model 2 and for the 
whole data set it was around 67%. Now it’s noteworthy to realise that only English clubs’ 
operational result is more persistent than the average, with quite high value of 78%. 
Spanish, German and French clubs are relatively close to each other with persistency of the 
operational result between 54-59%, but Italian clubs are far behind with the value of 42%. 
Interestingly Italian clubs were also far behind with the persistency of revenue. It could be 
the case that Italian clubs are more managed as football teams than healthy businesses, 
which would result this sort lack of persistency. 
 
As one can see from the Table 5, there unfortunately aren’t many statistically significant 
results, which actually was quite expected. Highly fascinating is to find out that winning 
the league is in relation with operational result only in English Premier League and 
actually that relation is very strong, as league winners are reporting on average $33.3 
million higher operational result than other English Premier League clubs. Clubs in 
German Bundesliga are only ones that benefit in terms of operational result from reaching 
one position higher on the league table. Statistically significant results state that on average 
reaching one position higher is in relation to $1.2 million greater operational result. Again, 
this is something that should be thought from both sides of the relation. It could be that 
financially successful clubs are just reaching higher positions. Or that clubs get rewarded 
so well from placing higher on the table that they’re not using all of the money to buy new 
players, or increase players wages, at least on the same year. 
 
Probably the most surprising result from the relation between league position and EBIT is 
that Italian clubs are actually reporting $0.6 million lower operational results when placing 
higher on the table. It could be the case that clubs have to increase their costs on the same 
year to get better results on the field, and that rewarding elements are only received next 
year. For Spanish and French clubs this EBIT model doesn’t provide any significant results 
on this time period. 
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Table 5. EBIT models by league 
 ENG SPA GER ITA FRA 
EBIT PREV YEAR 
0.776*** 
(0.000) 
0.541*** 
(0.000) 
0.588*** 
(0.000) 
0.419*** 
(0.000) 
0.544*** 
(0.000) 
LEAGUE POSITION 
743 
(0.144) 
-446 
(0.208) 
-1192** 
(0.011) 
637* 
(0.081) 
230 
(0.263) 
WINNER 
33349** 
(0.014) 
-692 
(0.954) 
7235 
(0.285) 
13451 
(0.218) 
-1397 
(0.802) 
Constant 
-11201* 
(0.078) 
8422** 
(0.047) 
13521*** 
(0.009) 
-13989*** 
(0.003) 
-8012*** 
(0.005) 
R2 0.557 0.360 0.658 0.239 0.325 
# of obs. 178 139 63 155 155 
Table 5 reports results for EBIT model, which is also separately run for each of the five leagues. Multivariate 
linear regression model is same as previously presented Model 2 without dummy variables for leagues. 
Dependent variable is EBIT/operational profit or loss. League position and winner variable are from current 
season. P-values are presented in parenthesis to evaluate significance of the results, p<0.01 ***, p<0.05 **, 
p<0.1 *. 
 
5.5 Pre- and post-UEFA Financial Fair Play 
 
Table 6 presents revenue models that are divided for time before UEFA Financial Fair Play 
Regulations and for time after regulations. Same revenue models are used as before, so 
explanatory powers are again high and varying from 0.914 to 0.940. Also, high persistency 
of revenue is again visible, but more interestingly it seems that already high persistency 
has even increased after the introduction of Financial Fair Play Regulations, from 81% to 
91% when using league positions from current year and from 89% to 95% when using 
league positions from previous year. This could actually signal that the regulations have 
increased club owner’s emphasis on running the clubs more like healthy businesses instead 
of solely focusing on sporting success. 
 
Previously it was stated that English Premier League clubs are generating clearly higher 
revenues than clubs from other top-five leagues and when looking at league dummies in 
Table 6, one can see that other clubs really can’t keep up with English club’s increasing 
revenues. Especially Italian clubs were already $15.2 million behind from English clubs in 
time period 2008-2011, but in 2012-2016 Italian clubs generated on average $28.7 million 
smaller revenues than English clubs after controlling for other factors. Spanish clubs have 
overtaken Italian clubs with approximately $2.5 million greater revenues in 2012-2016 on 
average. German clubs are closest to English clubs with still $15.3 million behind in terms 
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of revenue, but the gap has also increased $3.2 million from years 2008-2011 to 2012-
2016. 
 
Interestingly, when looking at the models with league position and winner dummy variable 
from current season, it seems that after the introduction of UEFA Financial Fair Play 
Regulations, winning the league and reaching higher position are still clearly connected 
with higher revenue, but not that much as before. Connection between league position has 
decreased from $1.6 million to $1.3 million. Also meaning of winning the league is now 
$3.8 million lesser than it was before the regulations. When moving to models with league 
position and winner dummy variable from previous season, results are actually entirely 
vice versa. At the time before regulations, connection couldn’t be found between winning 
the league on previous season and current year’s revenues. On time when regulations have 
been active the same connection has been statistically significant with the value of $22.8 
million higher revenues on the year after winning the league. 
 
It seems that the introduction of UEFA Financial Fair Play Regulations has resulted at least 
couple of things in terms of connection between sporting success and revenue. It can’t be 
precisely proven that these changes are coming directly from the regulations, but it’s very 
likely that at least some part of the results are directly or indirectly coming from the 
introduction of these new regulations. It seems that rewarding of reaching higher position 
on current season is delayed and increases in revenue are gathered more on the next 
season. Also rewarding element of winning the league has at least partly been delayed and 
its rewards are gathered on the next season in terms of higher revenues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 66 
Table 6. Revenue models by time period 
 
(1) 
Revenue 08-11 
(2) 
Revenue 12-16 
(3) 
Revenue 08-11 
(4) 
Revenue 12-16 
REVENUE PREV YEAR 
0.814*** 
(0.000) 
0.905*** 
(0.000) 
0.886*** 
(0.000) 
0.947*** 
(0.000) 
LEAGUE POSITION 
-1655*** 
(0.000) 
-1303*** 
(0.004) 
  
LEAGUE POSITION PREV YEAR   
-2365*** 
(0.000) 
-2691*** 
(0.000) 
WINNER 
63092*** 
(0.000) 
59324*** 
(0.000) 
  
WINNER PREV YEAR   
11456 
(0.319) 
22771** 
(0.025) 
SPA 
-22204*** 
(0.000) 
-26210*** 
(0.000) 
-11175* 
(0.076) 
-10281* 
(0.098) 
GER 
-12025* 
(0.071) 
-15256* 
(0.055) 
657 
(0.926) 
3252 
(0.682) 
ITA 
-15173*** 
(0.003) 
-28696*** 
(0.000) 
-9004 
(0.110) 
-12167** 
(0.045) 
FRA 
-28158*** 
(0.000) 
-32349*** 
(0.000) 
-13992** 
(0.022) 
-10778* 
(0.097) 
Constant 
60614*** 
(0.000) 
55898*** 
(0.000) 
46308*** 
(0.000) 
43097*** 
(0.000) 
R2 0.920 0.937 0.914 0.940 
# of obs. 297 393 291 388 
Table 6 reports results for revenue models, which are separately run for time before UEFA FFP regulations 
and time after regulations. Multivariate linear regression models are same as previously presented Models 
1&3 in chapter 4. Dependent variable for all the models is revenue. League position and winner variable are 
from current season for models (1) & (2) and from previous season for models (3) and (4). P-values are 
presented in parenthesis to evaluate significance of the results, p<0.01 ***, p<0.05 **, p<0.1 *. 
 
Table 7 is quite similar as Table 6, but now dependent variable is EBIT for all of the 
models, which are compared in terms of time before Financial Fair Play Regulations and 
time after the regulations. Again, as it has been seen before on the study, EBIT models 
have smaller explanatory power than revenue models and there are not so many 
statistically significant results in comparison to revenue models. Still one of the most 
important findings of the study can be made from the table below. With statistically 
significant results, it can be said that persistency of operational result has decreased 
enormously, from 90% to 55% with current year’s league positions and winner variable, 
and from 90% to 60% with previous season’s league positions and winner variable. It’s 
difficult to make assumptions what has led to this great change in the figures, and further 
study would be required to completely understand the change. Still, as operational results 
of football clubs in this data set are clearly negative (on average $8.7 million), this sort of 
development towards non-persistent operational losses actually could signal the positive 
impact that Financial Fair Play Regulations have had towards clubs’ profitability. 
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The main idea of the Table 7 is to seek differences in relation between sporting success 
and greater operational result before and after the introduction of Financial Fair Play 
Regulations. On time before regulations, league position was interestingly negatively 
associated with operational result on the same year ($0.5 million for each position) with 
some statistical significance (p<0.1). This actually was the case for Italian clubs in the 
whole timeline from 2008 to 2016. However, after the regulations went active there 
couldn’t be found any statistically important relation between league position and EBIT. 
This could be reasoned the way that on time before regulations, clubs had to use more 
money and make bigger financial losses to reach higher positions on the league table. 
However, now on the few years that regulations have been active, this same connection 
doesn’t exist anymore. Thus, clubs can strive to sporting success also without making that 
big operational losses. This result doesn’t quite match the expectations because positive 
connection couldn’t be found. Though, one should notice that regulations have been active 
only for few years and connection has already changed from negative to non-existing. 
 
Highly important finding from the table is also that on the time before regulations, there 
couldn’t be found statistically significant connection between winning the league and 
operational result. Since regulations were introduced, league winners are reporting on 
average $11.1 million greater operational results on the same year and $11.6 million higher 
result on the year after. These findings are also somewhat statistically significant, and it 
would be very interesting to study deeper and figure out what has led to this change. I am 
pretty confident that this result is somewhat proving that Financial Fair Play Regulations 
have had positive effect at least on the top clubs’ profitability. Opposing arguments could 
be also made that clubs might just have found ways to make it look good on the paper and 
in reality, nothing has changed. Sorting this out is very much out of the scope of this study, 
but in the future, this could be a good topic to study. Unfortunately studying this would 
probably require access to confidential information. However, since UEFA introduced 
these regulations and are monitoring that clubs are following the rules, one should believe 
that they’ll also study the possible loop holes that clubs might be using to avoid the 
consequences of the regulations. 
 
 
 
  
 68 
Table 7. EBIT models by time period 
 
(1) 
EBIT 08-11 
(2) 
EBIT 12-16 
(3) 
EBIT 08-11 
(4) 
EBIT 12-16 
EBIT PREV YEAR 
0.899*** 
(0.000) 
0.550*** 
(0.000) 
0.895*** 
(0.000) 
0.604*** 
(0.000) 
LEAGUE POSITION 
516* 
(0.068) 
-155 
(0.504) 
  
LEAGUE POSITION PREV YEAR   
-33 
(0.905) 
-361 
(0.127) 
WINNER 
11987 
(0.137) 
11124* 
(0.058) 
  
WINNER PREV YEAR   
-6634 
(0.420) 
11551* 
(0.052) 
SPA 
3989 
(0.384) 
10823*** 
(0.003) 
9436** 
(0.036) 
13357*** 
(0.000) 
GER 
1260 
(0.826) 
9484* 
(0.053) 
6853 
(0.223) 
14656*** 
(0.004) 
ITA 
-1143 
(0.794) 
-1919 
(0.585) 
3143 
(0.469) 
6706* 
(0.064) 
FRA 
20 
(0.996) 
-1328 
(0.707) 
5483 
(0.194) 
4999 
(0.169) 
Constant 
-9124** 
(0.045) 
-1764*** 
(0.619) 
-9401** 
(0.034) 
-6018 
(0.101) 
R2 0.542 0.493 0.559 0.517 
# of obs. 297 393 291 388 
Table 7 reports results for EBIT models, which are separately run for time before UEFA FFP regulations and 
time after regulations. Multivariate linear regression models are same as previously presented Models 2&4 in 
chapter 4. Dependent variable for all the models is EBIT. League position and winner variable are from 
current season for models (1) & (2) and from previous season for models (3) and (4). P-values are presented 
in parenthesis to evaluate significance of the results, p<0.01 ***, p<0.05 **, p<0.1 *. 
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6 Conclusions 
 
In this study, I have investigated the relation between sporting and financial success of 
football clubs in European top-five leagues. Sporting success was divided to two 
indicators: league position and league winner, whereas financial success was measured by 
revenue and operational P/L. The relation between sporting and financial success was 
studied from three different point of views. Firstly, the connection was studied for the 
whole data and compared whether connection differs when using indicators from the same 
year/season in comparison to using sporting success measurements from previous season 
and financial success measurements from current season. Secondly, the relation was 
studied separately for each of the top-five leagues to see how the connection differs 
between Europe’s top leagues. Lastly, it was studied how the connection is different on 
time before UEFA introduced Financial Fair Play Regulations in comparison to the time 
after the introduction of regulations. The sample consisted of 139 clubs on time period of 
2008-2016, which in total meant 690 observations. 
 
It is found that sporting success has statistically significant connection with higher 
revenues, which is line with previous research (e.g. Szymanski & Kuypers, 1999; Barajas, 
et al., 2005. Positive connection was also found between winning the league and greater 
operational result on the same year. When measuring sporting successfulness from the 
previous year, it was found that one league position affects almost twice the amount on the 
revenue on the next year than on the same year. At the same time winning the league is in 
connection with much greater revenues on the same year than what was the case on the 
next year. 
 
Winning the league is connection with greater revenues for all of the top-five leagues, and 
the connection is highest in French Ligue 1 and lowest in English Premier League. 
Reaching higher position on the league table is also in statistically significant connection 
with greater revenues in England, Germany and Italy. This connection couldn’t be found 
for Spain and France. Operational result is in connection with winning the league only in 
English Premier League, where winners report on average $33.3 million higher operational 
result than other teams. Positive connection between league position and operational result 
was only found in German Bundesliga, but surprisingly negative connection was found in 
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Italian Serie A, where one position higher on league table amounted on average to $0.6 
million smaller operating result. 
 
Revenue is in connection with winning the league and reaching higher position on the table 
both before and after the introduction of UEFA Financial Fair Play Regulations. Since the 
regulations were introduced, relations have slightly changed to the way that now current 
season’s sporting success have greater effect on next year’s revenue and smaller effect on 
current year’s revenue. Operational result was surprisingly negatively connected with 
league position on the time before regulations, and after the regulations, statistically 
significant connection doesn’t exist. Winning the league wasn’t in statistically significant 
connection with operational result on time before the regulations, but since introduction, 
league winners have reported on average $11.1 million greater operational result on same 
year and $11.6 million greater result on next year. 
 
Most important limitation of the study is being dependent on publicly available data, which 
isn’t officially monitored. Financial data is gathered from a single source (Orbis –database) 
and it didn’t include data for all of the clubs, and for some clubs only part of the data could 
be gathered. In addition, sporting success data, in this case league positions, are 
handpicked from archives of leagues’ websites, which might increase the risk of falsified 
data. For some parts of the study, one should also be careful that not too far-reaching 
conclusions are made based on the data used in this study. This is especially the case when 
analysing connection between financial success and winning the league. Although data 
includes 33 data points for winner -variable, through competitive imbalance in European 
football, there are only 16 different league winner clubs. Thus, when comparing the 
connections between countries, it should be noticed that results might be a bit biased and 
tell us more about the particular club than the whole league. This is the case especially in 
Italian Serie A and German Bundesliga, where in both leagues one club represents more 
than 75% of the winner data points used in this study. Finally, also one important 
limitation that has already been discussed, is that the study doesn’t provide a picture of 
cause and effect relationships in the found connections. Thus, one should also avoid 
making too far-reaching conclusions about causes and effects. 
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For further research, I would suggest taking into account sporting success also in other 
competitions than domestic league. Interesting findings could be also made when dividing 
clubs to the ones that have qualified for European competitions and to the others that 
haven’t and compare their connections between sporting and financial success. As football 
is developing all the time and the Financial Fair Play Regulations are quite new, same kind 
of study could also be repeated in few years to see latest developments. Highly interesting 
would be also deeper analysis of this study’s conclusions and if possible, finding and 
proving cause and effect relations. 
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